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Bangladesh has substantially liberalized its trade and agricultural pricing policies since 
independence in 1971, removing most distortions to agricultural incentives by the mid-1990s. 
Although trade protection for some agricultural and industrial products has increased sharply 
since 1998, total distortions in agriculture remain small. In particular, domestic and international 
trade policies for the major staples, rice and wheat, are substantially more liberal than in Pakistan 
or India.  
In the early 1970s, Bangladesh pursued a highly restrictive trade and exchange rate policy 
characterized by import regulations, high import tariffs, export taxes, pervasive quantitative 
restrictions, and an overvalued exchange rate, similar to policies of the 1960s when it was part of 
united Pakistan. The policy regime in the 1970s was especially restrictive for the agricultural 
sector. The government had a monopoly on import of most agricultural commodities and placed 
major restrictions on exports of raw jute, the major agricultural export. As a result of these 
distortions, agricultural price incentives were substantially reduced throughout the period 
(Rahman 1994). 
Disenchanted by the outcome of the policy as reflected in slow economic growth and 
continued balance of payments problems, and under pressure from donors, the country began 
initial reforms in its trade and exchange rate policies in the early 1980s. The major trade and 
exchange rate policy liberalization did nt take place until the early 1990s, however,when it 
involved broad liberalization of trade and exchange rate policies as well as of agricultural trade 
and pricing reforms. By the mid-1990s, agricultural output price distortions had been virttually 
eliminated on rice and wheat, and total distortions were minimal. Bangladesh sharply raised 
import tariffs on rice in response to subsidized exports by India in 2001, but domestic rates of 
assistance calculated relative to international market prices indicate only small overall 
agricultural price distortions in Bangladesh in the present decade.  
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This chapter describes the changing structure of distortions to agricultural incentives in 
Bangladesh, and the forces that have driven it. The next section describes the growth and 
structural changes of the Bangladesh economy with particular emphasis on the agricultural 
sector. An overview of the evolution of agricultural policies in Bangladesh since independence is 
then provided, before reporting our time series of estimates of nominal rates of assistance 
(NRAs) for selected agricultural products. The the changing political economy of agricultural 
price and trade policies is then discussed, followed by some concluding observations. 
 
 
Economic growth and structural changes 
 
 
GDP growth in Bangladesh has accelerated steadily since the early 1980s. The average GDP 
growth rate increased from 3.2 percent during 1980-84 to 5.3 percent during 2000-04.
1 The 
acceleration in per capita income growth has been even greater, because the population growth 
rate has declined over the last twenty-five years (from 2.2 to 1.5 percent per year). Several 
features of the policy environment during that period of growth are noteworthy, including a 
stable macroeconomic environment, a continued emphasis on the private sector as the engine of 
economic growth, economic liberalization and outward orientation, and an emphasis on 
agriculture and rural development. 
The growth rate in the agricultural, forestry and fishing sector has been considerably 
slower than overall GDP growth, at only 2.8 percent over the period 1980-2004. This growth was 
also highly uneven though: it averaged only 1.7 percent per year during the first half of the 
1990s, when the crop sub-sector declined slightly, but during the second half of the 1990s the 
crop sub-sector surged to an average of 3.8 percent per year so that total agriculture grew at 4.8 
percent per year. Growth in the fishing sub-sector was even more rapid in the 1990s, averaging 
8.1 percent per year, but that slowed substantially after 2000, to 1.7 percent (Appendix Table 
A1). 
                                                 
1 Throughout this chapter, crop or fiscal years are indicated by the second of the two calendar years (e.g., 2005 
refers to 2004/05).  
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Thus, as in most other countries, sustained economic growth in Bangladesh has been 
accompanied by a structural transformation with a declining share of agriculture, in spite of 
positive agricultural GDP growth. The share of agriculture has declined from 32 percent of total 
GDP in 1980-84 to 23 percent in 2000-04 (of which about 7 percentage points is forestry and 
fishing throughout this period), while that of industry has risen  from 18 to 28 percent and that of 
services has remained around 50 percent. Readymade garment exports have boomed in the past 
two decades, causing agriculture’s share of national exports to fall from more than one-third in 
the 1970s and 1980s to less than one-twelth in the present decade. Nonetheless, more than 60 
percent of the country’s labor force continues to be employed at least part time in agriculture. 
Moreover, because agricultural production provides critical linkages for development of the rest 
of the economy, its performance has an important bearing on employment generation, food 
security and poverty alleviation. For these reasons, agricultural growth remains a development 
priority.  
Within agriculture, field crops and horticulture are the dominant activities, accounting for 
four times as much agricultural value added since the early 1980s as livestock activities 
(Appendix Table A2). Cropping is dominated by the production of cereals, especially rice, for 
which technological progress supported by the development of irrigation infrastructure has been 
the main engine of its growth. Rice accounted for about 70 percent of value added from crop 
production in 1973 and about 80 percent in 1999. The rapid expansion of rice production has 
been achieved in part at the expense of pulses and oilseeds (which remain important sources of 
protein and micro-nutrients). Apart from rice and wheat, the only other crops with rapid growth 
rates over the past two decades are maize, potato and vegetables. 
Domestic demand factors have contributed to this structural change in the agricultural 
economy of Bangladesh. They include income growth in aggregate plus the acceleration in the 
growth of per capita income due to the slowdown in population growth. Population growth was 
the dominant factor behind the growth in domestic demand for food in the 1970s when per capita 
incomes were basically stagnant. In the 1990s, income growth and the varying income elasticity 
of demand for different foods became a major factor behind the pattern of growth in domestic 
demand. Farmers have now started to respond to market signals by reallocating resources to 




   
Agricultural exports 
 
In 1973, exports of agricultural commodities from Bangladesh stood at just over 80 percent of 
Bangladesh’s total exports. Their value grew at a modest trend rate of 4.2 percent in nominal 
terms and 1.4 percent in real terms over the subsequent three decades, and most of that growth 
was due to fishing (shrimp). In contrast, Bangladesh’s overall exports grew at a trend rate of 
nearly 11 percent (8.4 percent in real terms), due largely to rapid growth of readymade garments. 
As a result, the share of readymade garments in Bangladesh’s total exports rose to nearly 75 
percent in 2004-05, while the share of agriculture in total export declined from 37 to 7 percent 
(Appendix Table A3). 
The composition of Bangladesh’s agricultural export has also undergone significant 
changes during these three decades. In the 1970s, the average share of exports of raw jute in total 
agricultural exports was 70 percent, while those for tea and shrimp were 17 and 9 percent, 
respectively. However, export of raw jute started facing stiff competition from synthetic 
substitutes. As a result, the real value of raw jute exports declined by about two-thirds from the 
1970s through to the early 1990s before stabilizing, but its share in total agricultural export 
earnings continued to fall as exports of shrimp and vegetables grew. By 2004, jute’s share was 
just 15 percent (and tea’s less than 3 percent), compared to 65 percent for shrimp and 6 percent 
(from zero in the 1970s) for vegetables. Rising demand for vegetables by expatriate 
Bangladeshis and various policy measures, particularly the provision of cash incentives and 




Like agricultural exports, the share of major agricultural imports (wheat, raw cotton, edible oil, 
rice, sugar, milk and cream, pulses, spices, oil seeds and tobacco) in total imports has declined 
since the 1970s. The share of these imports declined from an average of 33 percent in the 1970s 
to 24 percent in the 1980s and only 16 percent in 2000-04 (Appendix Table A3). The total real 
value of major agricultural imports nonetheless increased over this period by an average of 2.1 
percent per year, faster than agricultural exports (1.4 percent per year), but much slower than  
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total imports (4.9 percent per year). In 2004, raw cotton, edible oil, wheat, rice, sugar and milk 
powder accounted (in decreasing order) for most of the agricutural imports into Bangladesh.  
It should be noted, however, that the above figures reflect the picture with regard to 
recorded imports only. Studies have shown that illegal imports from India constitute nearly 20 
percent of Bangladesh’s total recorded imports (Bakht 1999). Of those illegal imports, two-thirds 
are made up of just six agricultural goods: cattle (42 percent), sugar (7 percent), pulses (6 
percent), milk powder (3 percent), spices (3 percent) and rice (2 percent). 
Historically, food aid constituted an important component of the wheat imports of 
Bangladesh. During the 1980s and 1990s, food aid accounted for about two-thirds of total wheat 
imports (about 1.0 million tons per year out of a total of 1.5 million tons per year), with 
government commercial imports accounting for the remainder The latter have supplemented 
domestic wheat procurement and food aid in supplying the Public Foodgrain Distribution System 
(PFDS) and – since trade liberalization in the early 1990s – private commercial imports. Food 
aid levels have dropped substantially since 1999, following large gains in domestic grain 
production. Food aid never provided more than 0.5 percent of rice supplies, however. Prior to 
1992-93, all commercial imports of rice were by the public sector, but since that time private 
sector imports have supplemented domestic production and government imports in response to 
market incentives.  
Imports of raw cotton are now the major agricultural import, surpassing rice and wheat 
combined in most years since 2000. Growth in the real value of raw cotton imports has been 
especially rapid since the early 1990s when the government started giving a 25 percent cash 
subsidy to exports of readymade garments produced using domestic fabric, a policy which 
encouraged rapid investment in textile spinning and composite mills (Bakht 2001a). Growth in 
the real value of imports of raw cotton averaged 12 percent per year in the 1990s and 15 percent 
from 1999 to 2004.  
The real value of imports of edible oil rose by 3.2 percent per year from the early 1970s 
to 2004, so that the share of edible oil in total agricultural imports remained close to one-fifth 
over the entire period. Recorded sugar imports (not including sugar smuggled in from India) 
have increased even more rapidly, rising from 1.4 percent of the value of agricultural imports in 
the early 1970s to 7 percent in 1999-04. Between 1973 and 2003 domestic production of sugar 
increased by only about 100 thousand metric tons (kt) raising the output level from 90 kt in 1973  
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to around 190 kt in 2003. In contrast, domestic demand for sugar increased by nearly 700 kt 
during this period. As a result, imports of sugar increased from about 12 kt in 1973 to nearly 600 
kt in 2003.  
 
 
Exchange rate and trade policies   
 
 
Bangladesh followed inward-oriented, import-substituting trade policies from independence in 
1971 until major reforms were instituted in the 1980s and especially the 1990s. This section 
provides a brief history of these policy reforms.  
 
The 1970s: inward-oriented policies 
 
Faced with an imminent balance of payments of crisis following independence in 1971, the first 
Bangladesh government continued highly restrictive trade and exchange rate policies similar to 
those it had been in place earlier when the economy was part of Pakistan. Quantitative 
restrictions on imports, high tariff rates and a fixed, overvalued exchange rate were used to 
control import levels, conserve scarce foreign exchange and provide protection for domestic 
industry. However, in line with the political philosophy of the then government, the protectionist 
trade regime stayed intact even after the possibility of a balance of payments crisis decreased 
substantially in the mid-1970s after a 70 percent devaluation of the Taka relative to the US dollar 
from 8.9 to 15.1 in 1975, a recovery in export earnings, an increase in foreign aid and a decline 
in world prices of grain and other commodities.  
Initially under the fixed exchange rate system, all foreign exchange accrued to the 
government and was then allocated to competing uses through a discretionary and cumbersome 
mechanism of import licensing. However, in response to foreign exchange crisis, the 
government, in the early 1970s, allowed the use of foreign exchange earned by Bangladeshi 
nationals abroad (workers’ remittances) to be used to import particular categories of goods in a 
system later called the Wage Earner’s Scheme (WES). At the same time, under the Export 
Performance License (XPL), certain exporters were given a specified proportion of their export  
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earnings in the form of an Import Entitlement Certificate (IEC) which could be utilized either to 
import particular categories of goods or to sell to other traders at a premium to import such 
goods. Thus, there was a de facto dual exchange rate where the XPL premium reflected to some 
extent the market price of foreign exchange. In 1977, wage earners were allowed to sell their 
foreign exchange earnings directly in a market that came to be known as the Secondary 
Exchange Market (SEM) at a the foreign exchange rate called the WES rate.  
During the early years of restrictive trade policy, most agricultural commodities were on 
the restricted or banned lists of imports. This was aimed at ensuring remunerative prices to 
producers by protecting producers from external competition. At the same time, there were 
restrictions on the export of agricultural products. Some agricultural exports were also subjected 
to export duties. The purpose here was to ensure adequate availability of agricultural 
commodities in the domestic market. Some fiscal incentives were provided to promote exports of 
non-traditional items, however. In the Export Policy Order of 1976, incomes from exports of 
non-traditional items were doubled from 15-20 percent to 30-40 percent.
2 Duty drawback 
schemes were also put into place to promote exports of textile products made with imported raw 
materials (see Appendix 1). 
The outcome of this autarkic trade and exchange rate policy, however, was disappointing 
in terms of export development, the balance of payments, and overall economic growth, 
particularly in comparison to the rapid growth of the East Asian economies that followed a more 
outward-oriented development strategy. Disenchanted with the import substitution strategy (and 
encouraged by donor conditionalities), policy makers in Bangladesh as well as in other South 
Asian countries began to tilt towards a more open economy policy in the late 1970s. In part, this 
shift in policy was also facilitated by a change in government in 1975 to one that reflected a more 
favorable view towards the development of a mixed economy and a more open trade regime. 
However, the export promotion measures that were gradually introduced in the late 1970s were 
limited in scope and only slowly implemented. Overall trade policies continued to be inward 
looking and the economy in general and the external sector in particular remained overregulated. 
 
The 1980s: initial policy reforms 
 
                                                 
2 By 1995, exporters also enjoyed exemption from income tax on 50 percent of their export earnings.  
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Following another round of political change in 1981, the new government that came to power in 
March 1982 started the implementation of a wide ranging policy reform package, called the New 
Industrial Policy (NIP), with the objective of liberalizing the economy. A large number of 
nationalized companies, especially in the jute and textile sectors, were privatized within a few 
years, and measures to increase foreign and domestic investment were put in place. However, 
only limited trade liberalization took place under the NIP or its successor, the Revised Industrial 
Policy (RIP), introduced in 1986. A cash compensatory scheme administered by the Bangladesh 
Bank was also introduced in 1986, providing cash equal to 15 percent of fob export values for 
exports made with local fabric.
3  
Ultimately, there was only slow progress in trade liberalization in the 1980s, particularly 
with respect to reductions in import tariffs (Bakht 2001b). But some liberalization of agricultural 
exports did occur: export duties on raw jute and tea were withdrawn in 1981, and those on dried 
fruits, fresh fruits, oil cakes, coriander seed, dry chili, dry ginger, black pepper, turmeric, 
tobacco, vegetables and potato were withdrawn in 1986. Restrictions on exports of jute seed, 
wheat, pulses of all kinds, shrimp other than frozen, frogs of all kinds (dead or alive) and their 
legs, and onions remained even after 1995. And export restrictions on rice and wheat bran and 
molasses were removed only in 1998. 
Nonetheless, major reforms in exchange rate policy did take place. In mid-1979, 
Bangladesh had adopted a flexible exchange rate policy, fixing the Taka to a basket of currencies 
of major trading partners.
4 Then, in 1986, The XPL system was simplified substantially by the 
introduction of the system known as Export Performance Benefit (XPB), under which the 
beneficiary exporters could directly cash their XPB entitlement at their banks at the existing 
WES rate. These policies contributed to the rapid growth of non-traditional exports during the 
1980s, which benefited largely from XPB, and to a rapid expansion of the secondary (WES) 
market. As shown in Appendix Table A6, a wide range of agricultural commodities benefited 
from the XPB incentives. However, exports of raw jute were not included in the XPB scheme 
and thus suffered directly from the overvalued exchange rate. 
                                                 
3 Other measures included the Export Policy Order 1986, which provided special inducement and promotional 
freight rates by the national flag carriers Bangladesh Biman airline and Bangladesh Shipping Corporation for 
exporting fruits, vegetables and ornamental plants. 
4 Initially, the reference currency was the Pound Sterling, but this was changed to the United States dollar in early 1983, 
because of the large US weight in total Bangladesh trade.  
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At the same time, imports financed at the official exchange rate were rapidly reduced and 
an increasing proportion of imports was subject to the SEM including part of the foreign 
exchange received under commodity aid. By 1991, 41 percent of all imports were financed out of 
this source while the share of SEM in non-aid imports was nearly 70 percent. The enhanced role 
of the SEM resulted in a narrowing of the gap between the official and the WES rate. Eventually, 
the two rates were unified in 1992, which marked the end of the XPB arrangement (Rahman 
1992). 
 
1990s: major trade liberalization 
 
After a decade of such half-hearted attempt towards trade liberalization, the democratic 
government that took over power in 1991 took bold steps towards reforming the trade regime. 
Reforms initiated during this period included reducing and compressing tariffs, implementing 
and publishing a less complicated import tax structure, gradually eliminating non-tariff import 
restrictions, and promoting exports through income tax exemptions, bonded warehousing, and 
flexible exchange rate management.
5 
Prior to the 1990s, Bangladesh relied heavily on quantitative restrictions to control levels 
of imports, particularly for agricultural commodities. About 37 percent of the tariff lines for 
agricultural products (21 percent of all products) were either banned or restricted in 1987 (World 
Bank 1994). By 1984, all quantitative restrictions on agricultural products had been removed and 
only 2 percent of tariff lines of all products faced quantitative restrictions. In particular, private 
sector imports of rice and wheat were legalized in the early 1990s, ending the government’s 
monopoly on foodgrain imports. The ban of rice export of fine quality rice (but not on exports of 
ordinary coarse rice) was also lifted. 
Trade liberalization in the early 1990s brought tariff rates down sharply as well, with 
total protective import duty rates (both customs duties and para tariffs) declining from 74 percent 
(unweighted average off all tariff lines) in 1991 to only 32 percent in 1995. Likewise, import 
tariffs and total tax incidence on the import of major agricultural commodities declined sharply 
                                                 
5 In 1996, the Bangladesh government accepted the conditions of Article VIII of the IMF by making the Taka fully 
convertible for international current account transactions. Under this arrangement, exporters can freely utilize their 
export earnings for import purposes.  
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during the early 1990s (Table 1).
6 Duties on refined edible oil, sugar, milk-powder, and spices 
were subject to relatively high duty rates, while raw cotton, wheat, rape seed and lentils enjoyed 
lower duty rates (Table 2). 
Trade reforms have stalled in recent years, however. Although customs duties declined 
from 29 percent in 1995 to 19 percent in 2003, para tariffs (surcharges, license fees, regulatory 
duties, value added tax and supplementary duties) rose sharply, mainly due to a sharp increase in 
supplementary duties. As a result, total protective import duty rates have remained essentially 
unchanged on average since the mid-1990s. For some products that were already protected 
(including processed fruits, cement, soap, cotton shirts and sheets, some ceramic and steel 
products, batteries, bicycles and toys), total protection rates rose by more than 30 percent 
between 1997 and 2003 (World Bank 2004). 
 
 
Impacts of agricultural price and trade policies on nominal rates of assistance 
 
 
We consider in this section the distortionary policies in place for several key crop products — 
rice, wheat, sugar and potatoes plus jute and tea, the traditional export crops. Together these 
products account for around three-quarters of the value of agricultural production at distirted 
prices (Figure 1). In line with the project’s methodology (Anderson et al. 2008), we estimate 
nominal rates of assistance (NRA) on output for each of those products. Through careful 
comparisons of domestic prices with prices at the border or international reference prices, 
adjusted for quality differences, marketing margins and the dual exchange rate system,
7 these 
measures capture the proportional extent to which government-imposed distortions create a gap 
between domestic prices and what they would be under free markets. Since it is not possible to 
understand the characteristics of agricultural development with a sectoral view alone, the 
project’s methodology not only estimates the effects of direct agricultural policy measures 
                                                 
6 For details on the duty structure on the import of major agricultural commodities during 1991-2003, see Appendix 
Table 5. 
7 The NRAs for tradables include an estimate of the trade tax effect of the overvalued exchange rate. As outlined in 
the methodology, that estimate uses the black market exchange rate premium (see Easterly 2006) and assumes that 
only half of exporters’ foreign exchange rate earnings are sold to the government at the official rate. See Anderson 
et al. (2008) for details of this methodology.  
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(including distortions in the foreign exchange market) but also generates estimates of distortions 
in non-agricultural sectors for comparative evaluation.
  
More specifically, this study computes a Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) for farmers 
including an adjustment for direct interventions on farminputs such as fertilizers. Once this is 
done for the key prpoducts, we then also generate an NRA for nonagricultural tradables, for 
comparison with that for agricultural tradables via the calculation of a Relative Rate of 





Given its predominance in the country’s agricultural sector, the impact of trade policy on overall 
agricultural incentives in Bangladesh is largely determined by price and trade policies for rice. 
Throughout its history, Bangladesh has been a net importer of rice, although in some years only 
minimal quantities were imported. From independence until 1992, private imports were banned 
and government commercial imports accounted for almost all rice imports (very little food aid 
was in the form of rice). Beginning in 1993 when private imports of rice were liberalized, the 
private sector has accounted for most rice imports.  
Since 1980 the average annual volume of wheat imports has been about three times that 
of rice (about 1550 and 550 kt , respectively). This higher share of wheat in total foodgrain 
imports in part reflects wheat food aid inflows and government policy that tended to favor the 
use of lower-cost wheat in the Public Foodgrain Distribution System (PFDS). Although rice 
accounted for about one-third of grain distributed through the PFDS (the other two-thirds was 
wheat), rice distribution represented only 4 percent of total net availability of rice in the 1970s, 
1980s and 1990s, the same share as in East Pakistan in the 1950s and in the 1960s.
9 Total rice 
imports averaged about 3 percent of net availability (calculated apart from changes in public 
stocks) over the 1980-2004 period. In contrast, wheat imports (largely food aid until the late 
1990s) accounted for about two-thirds of total availability of wheat in this period. In total, 
though, imports as a share of availability have steadily declined, from 17 percent in the 1980s to 
14 percent in the 1990s and only 11 percent on average during 2000-04 (Table 3).  
                                                 
8 Throughout this section the reference to the ‘agricultural’ sector is to just crop and livestock production, excluding 
fishing and forestry. 
9 See Ahmed, Nuruddin, Chowdhury and Haggblade (2000, Table 6.4, p. 129).  
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From the early 1970s through 2005, Bangladesh wholesale prices of rice have averaged 
close to import parity (calculated on the basis of the average price of Bangladesh rice imports). 
This average masks wide fluctuations from year to year, however, particularly when the public 
sector had a monopoly on imports and thus there was no direct link between international and 
domestic prices.  
In the wake of the major destruction to transport infrastructure during the war in 1971 
and following the rice production shortfall in 1974, Bangladesh suffered through a famine in 
1974 as the government lacked the foreign exchange to purchase sufficient rice imports to make 
up the deficit at the prevailing extremely high international prices.
10 The domestic rice price rose 
substantially in 1974/75 season, but was still below the international price. After this crisis and a 
61 percent devaluation of the Taka relative to the US dollar in May 1975, the domestic wholesale 
rice price was double the import parity level, but in the subsequent six years it was below again 
(Figure 2).  
Total rice and wheat imports combined were 10 percent of total foodgrain supply, but 
since wheat not a close substitute for rice in domestic consumption in Bangladesh (Goletti 1994), 
the effect of wheat imports (mainly food aid) on rice market prices was likely to have been small. 
Nonetheless, in the absence of wheat imports domestic rice prices would have been somewhat 
higher in this period.
11  
In the early 1980s, rapid increases in domestic production of rice led to increased 
availability and lower real wholesale prices. International rice prices were falling even faster 
though, so that over the five year period, 1983-87, domestic prices were on average 21 percent 
above import parity levels. The government monopoly on imports thus had an effect on rice 
tariffs similar to that of an import tariff under a liberalized trade environment, favoring net 
sellers of rice relative to net buyers. A surge in domestic rice production (mainly of winter (boro) 
season rice) following major floods in 1987 and 1988 led to another drop in real wholesale rice 
prices in 1989, however, bringing Bangladesh prices to border price levels and eliminating the 
implicit protection to producers. This price-stabilizing role of government tends to lead to a 
negative correlation between the NRA and the border price, the extent of which is evident in 
Figure 2. 
                                                 
10 See Ravallion (1990) and del Ninno, Dorosh and Islam (2002) for detailed discussion of markets and government 
policy in this period. 
11 To fully analyze this policy would require a multi-market model as in Dorosh and Haggblade (1997).  
 
14
   
Trade liberalization in the early 1990s brought a potential direct link between domestic 
and border prices, particularly in periods following poor domestic rice harvests. Throughout the 
1980s and early 1990s, Thailand was the major source of Bangladesh rice imports. However, the 
1994 liberalization that permitted private sector imports coincided with India’s rice trade 
liberalization and build-up of public rice stocks, which made legal private sector rice imports 
from India feasible.
12 With lower transport costs, reduced time of delivery (for private sector 
imports), and the possibility of smaller import contracts delivered by truck, India rapidly 
replaced Thailand as the major source of imports by Bangldesh in the mid-1990s. Large-scale 
imports from India supplemented Bangladesh domestic supplies following crop shortfalls in 
1994, 1997 and 1998.
13 In these latter two years (1997 and 1998), 92 percent of rice imports 
came from India. In periods following normal or above-average rice harvests, however (most of 
1996 and 1997, and again in 2000 and the first half of 2001), domestic rice prices in Bangladesh 
were below import parity levels, eliminating incentives for private sector imports (Figure 2).
14 
On average, domestic wholesale prices were 5 and 12 percent below average import parity prices 
in the 1990-94 and 1995-99 periods, respectively, although there were few trade barriers in this 
period. Instead, the negative NRA reflects periods when rice came close to being a nontradable 
good because of good domestic harvests.  
Beginning in 2000, the Government of India took increasingly aggressive measures to 
promote exports to solve a problem of massive public stock build-up. This included subsidizing 
rice exports by providing grain from government stocks to exporters at below cost).
15 With 
Bangladesh prices approximately equal to full cost (including tax) import parity prices of BPL 
(Below Poverty Line) rice from India, small amounts of low quality rice were imported into 
Bangladesh in 2000.
16 When India lowered its APL sales price for “fine” rice in July 2001 from 
                                                 
12 Other factors contributed to India’s increase in rice exports, including a 27 depreciation of the rupee in real terms. 
See Dorosh (2001). 
13 There were three successive poor Bangladesh rice harvests in 1994 and 1995 (aman 1994, boro 1995 and aman 
1995), a poor aman crop in 1997, and severe losses to the 1998 aus and aman crops following the mid-1998 flood. 
See Dorosh et al. (2004) for a discussion of government trade and pricing policies for food grains following the 
1998 flood. 
14  Small amounts of non-parboiled rice were imported in 2000, mainly from Vietnam. Higher quality (non-coarse) 
rice imports likely accounted for much of the rest (Dorosh 2001).  
15 For example, in 2000 state trading parastatals could buy wheat at the below-poverty-line (BPL) price for export 
(USDA 2001). See also Dorosh and Shahabuddin (2005). 
16 During 2000, Bangladesh imported 281 kt of rice from across land borders from India (essentially the same as the 
1999 volume of 286 kt. The breakdown of rice by quality is not available, but a 9 percent decline in the average  
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11.3 Rs/kg to only 8.3 Rs/kg, however, Bangladesh increased the rice import tariffs and taxes 
from 5 percent to 37.5 percent
17, raising the BPL import parity (with tax) price 33 percent above 
domestic price levels essentially cutting off incentives for private sector trade with India
18 
(Figure 8). However, in mid-2002, Bangladesh domestic prices again rose to levels approaching 
import parity levels (including tax), and relatively large-scale private sector trade with India 
began again. Between mid-2002 and early 2006, Bangladesh domestic prices have been at or 
near import parity (including tax) BPL prices, suggesting that the BPL import parity (including 
tax) price has essentially determined Bangladesh rice market prices over this period.
19  
On average, during 2002-04 wholesale prices in Bangladesh were only 1 percent below 
the BPL import parity price (including taxes). Import tariffs raised domestic prices relative to 
import parity prices (without tax) of subsidized Indian BPL rice by an average of 10 percent, but 
Bangladesh prices were 28 percent below import parity prices based on wholesale prices in Delhi 
and 15 percent below import parity ex Bangkok. In the absence of these subsidized imports, 
domestic net supply (apart from government interventions) would have been 5 percent less over 
the three year period, and domestic rice prices would have about 15-25 percent higher (the lower 
value assuming an own-price elasticity of rice demand of -0.3, and the higher value assuming an 
own-price elasticity of rice demand of -0.2). Thus, under the first assumption, prices would have 




Wheat was a minor crop in Bangladesh in the 1960s prior to independence, but its production 
increased rapidly from an average of about 100 kt per year from 1969 to 1974 to an average of 
more than 1.8 million tons per year during 1997-99, due to a seven-fold expansion in area and a 
doubling of wheat yields per ha. Wheat production growth was especially rapid in the 1970s, 
increasing by an average of 37 percent per year, as area increased by 19 percent per year and 
yields rose by 15 percent per year. In recent years, however, wheat area has declined from a peak 
                                                                                                                                                             
price of imports from India, from 12.1 Tk/kg in 1999 to 11.1 Tk/kg in 2000, suggests that the average quality of 
imports may have declined between the two years. 
17 Including advanced income tax of 3 percent and a license fee of 2.5 percent, the total tariffs and fees were 
increased from 10.5 percent to 43.0 percent. 
18 The increase in import taxes raised the APL import parity (with tax) to 71 percent above domestic price levels. 
19 NRAs on output using average cost of imports suggest that NRAs on output were essentially zero, perhaps 
because shipments of high quality rice raise the average import price above the import parity price of BPL rice.   
 
16
   
of 967,000 hectares in 1998 to 704,000 hectares in 2003, as area planted to boro rice, maize and 
potatoes expanded (Dorosh 2006). 
Because of the government monopoly on external trade, there was no explicit link 
between international and domestic prices of wheat in the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. Since 
food aid and government commercial imports together accounted for over half of total supply, 
government policy regarding net distribution of wheat (there was limited domestic procurement 
of wheat, as well) was the dominant factor determining domestic market prices.  
In part because of food aid conditionality by donors that stipulated that food aid should 
not cause price disincentives for domestic production, domestic prices of wheat were on average 
close to import parity levels throughout this period. After the devaluation in 1975, estimated 
NRAs on output averaged just 3 percent between 1976 and 1993 (Table 4).  
After liberalization of imports for wheat in 1992, import parity prices of wheat provided a 
price ceiling for wheat, as it did for rice. In most years, domestic prices were close to this ceiling 
so that NRAs on output averaged less than 4 percent after 1994. Only during a period of high 
international wheat prices around 1996 were domestic prices substantially below border prices 
(NRAs of -14 percent). 
From the mid-1990s until 2000, most commercial wheat imports were high-gluten wheat 
for baking purposes imported from major international wheat exporters such as the United States, 
Australia and the European Union. This wheat, which accounted for about 10 percent of total 
wheat use in Bangladesh, did not directly compete with soft, lower-gluten domestic wheat which 
is mostly used for traditional breads (e.g. roti and chapati). After 2000, however, subsidized 
exports of wheat from India entered Bangladesh markets in several years.  
Given rapid increases in rice production and supply and lower real rice prices (which 
reduce wheat demand), continued high levels of food aid shipments after 1999 would likely have 
reduced domestic wheat prices below import parity levels (del Ninno and Dorosh 2003). 
However, donors substantially reduced food aid to Bangladesh after 2001 in part because 
Bangladesh had achieved its domestic food production target of 454 grams/person/day, thus 
eliminating its notional “food gap”, and also because of a shift out of food aid in-kind by the EU 
and a shift in food aid resources to other parts of the world by the United States and others. 
Nonetheless, wheat production has declined since 2000 largely due to increased competition  
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from maize, for which hybrid varieties have proven to be profitable and which have a growing 




With the emergence of readymade garments in the early 1980s, jute lost its prominent share of 
total export earnings. Nonetheless, it is still an important farm export commodity, and 
Bangladesh remains the leading exporter of raw jute in the world. Moreover, a significant 
number of farm households continue to depend on its cultivation for their livelihood.  
International jute prices have been declining steadily over time, however, as world 
demand for jute has fallen with the advent of synthetic substitutes. The nominal export price of 
jute has declined by an average of 1.5 percent per year in US dollar terms from 1973 to 2004. 
The decline in real prices has been even steeper: -4.2 percent per year, (measured using the US 
wholesale price index as a deflator for the dollar price series). As a result, the real (2004-05) 
dollar price of jute fell by two-thirds between the late 1970s and the early 2000s. Since the 
quantity of Bangladesh raw jute exports has remained approximately flat over the period 
(Appendix Figure 2), export earnings have fallen dramatically. 
Domestic prices of jute have been consistently below export parity prices, in part because 
of an effort to encourage domestic processing of jute products for subsequent export.
20 In the 
1970s and 1980s, domestic wholesale jute prices were on average more than 30 percent below 
export parity levels.
21 Following the trade liberalization of the early 1990s, NRAs on output for 
jute averaged only 6 percent below export parity level. However, with the closing of public 
sector jute mills, domestic raw jute prices have again fallen sharply below export parity prices, 
perhaps reflecting the disruption in marketing channels and a greater differential between quality 




                                                 
20 For example, from 1995-96 through 2002-03, the value of manufactured jute products was more than three times 
than of raw jute exports. (Calculated using data from the Bangladesh Export Promotion in World Bank (2005, Table 
2, p. 155).)  See also the discussion on policies in the East Pakistan era in the Appendix. 
21 In the ten years leading up to independence from Pakistan in 1971, the jute export tax equivalent in East Pakistan 
was at least as severe as, and probably much more than, that in the rest of the 1970s (see Appendix).  
 
18
   
Like jute, tea was once a major export of Bangladesh (and East Pakistan). Between 1973 and 
1983 the value of exports of tea rose in nominal dollar terms, but mainly because of an increase 
in the international price of tea. However, since the peak export level of $69 million in 1983, 
export earnings from tea have declined steadily and were only $16 million in 2004. One factor 
contributing to declining export is the rise in domestic demand for tea. During the last three 
decades, tea production in Bangladesh grew at a trend rate of 2 percent while domestic 
consumption of tea increased at a trend rate of 7.5 percent, leaving a smaller exportable surplus. 
Domestic prices of tea (based on the auction at Chittagong) have been consistently 10 to 
20 percent below export parity prices of tea (average export price in Chittagong), perhaps 
reflecting handling costs at the port. Earlier analyses by Rahman (1994) using border prices 
based on the London auction price discounted by 30 percent, less marketing and processing costs 
from the tea gardens in Sylhet (in northeast Bangladesh to Chittagong port), suggested little 
difference between domestic and border prices in most years between 1974 and 1987 except 
when border prices spiked in 1976, 1983 and 1984). These differences between average export 
prices and Chittagong auction prices, or between average export prices and London auction 





Bangladesh produces less than 20 percent of the sugar it consumes, with the remainder coming 
from official imports (nearly half of consumption) or smuggled from neighboring India.
22 The 
Bangladesh sugar industry is highly protected through import tariffs, with levels of imports 
controlled either through licensing (prior to 1992), a government monopoly (1992-2001), or both 
government parastatals and at times private traders (after June 2002). As a result, domestic prices 
of sugar are substantially higher than world prices. Farmers do not reap all the benefits of this 
policy, however, since sugar cane prices are fixed by the government, and sugar mills retain a 
                                                 
22 Estimates for 2002 are 177 kt from domestic production, 349 kt of official imports from India, 93 kt of official 
imports from other countries, and 400 kt of imports smuggled from India (Pursell 2005, p. 27).  
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monopsony on sugar cane purchases within designated reserved sugar cane areas near each 
mill.
23  
Official trade has generally faced very high import tariffs. For example, tariffs on sugar 
imports were 135 percent in 1992 before major trade liberalization, but still 47 percent in 2002 
after the liberalization. These high tariffs on sugar have greatly reduced imports of sugar through 
official channels, but have also provided major incentives for smuggling of sugar.  
Measures of NRAs on output vary substantially over time, largely because of fluctuations 
in world prices of sugar but also because milling, transport and marketing costs are subtracted 
from sugar border prices in determining the growwers’ sugar cane prices. NRAs on output 
averaged more than 150 percent in the 1980s and 1990s and even more this decade (Table 4).  
 
Distortions to input prices 
 
Modern agricultural technology was introduced to East Pakistan in the early 1960s with heavy 
public sector involvement in the procurement and distribution of modern agricultural inputs, as 
well as investment for water resources development. A public parastatal, the East Pakistan 
Agricultural Development Corporation, later known as the Bangladesh Agricultural 
Development Corporation (BADC) was established in 1963 on the basis of recommendations of 
the Agricultural Commission in 1960. BADC held a virtual monopoly over the procurement and 
distribution of fertilizers, seeds, pesticides and minor irrigation equipment in the country, 
although it had to conform to the pricing and related policies that the government formulated 
from time to time.
24  
Major reforms in markets for fertilizer and irrigation equipment markets were begun 
during the late 1970s (Appendix Table A8). Under the New Marketing System established in 
1978, private trade in fertilizer was liberalized, leading to a large expansion in the number of 
wholesalers and retailers operating in the fertilizer market.
25 The share of private trade climbed 
to 75 percent in 1989 and nearly 100 percent by 1992, when the ban on private sector import of 
                                                 
23 Until June 2002, the Bangladesh Sugar and Food Industries Corporation (BSFIC), a public enterprise, and Trading 
Corporation of Bangladesh (TCB) shared a monopoly on sugar imports (Pursell 2005, p. 17). 
24 Another parastatal, the Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) was also established in the early 1960s to 
implement large-scale surface water irrigation as well as flood control and drainage projects, following suggestions 
by a Master Plan prepared in the aftermath of disastrous floods of the mid-1950s. 
25 In spite of privatization of the distribution of fertilizers, most urea production stayed in the public sector.   
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fertilizer was removed and the deregulation in fertilizer marketing was completed. Between 
December 1994 and March 1995, however, a serious shortage in the supply of urea led to a crisis 
in the fertilizer market, resulting in a partial reversal of the reform process by imposing controls 
on wholesale markets, regulating pricing at factory gates and imposing some restrictions on 
domestic traders selling outside their districts of registration (Ahmed 2001).
26 
Subsidies on nitrogenous fertilizer, which is produced domestically, have been the major 
distortion to agricultural input prices in Bangladesh. Fertilizer prices at the farm level were 
deregulated throughout the country by 1983, eliminating direct subsidies to farmers for urea. 
Subsidies on imports of other fertilizers (Triple Super Phosphate and Muriate of Potash), 
designed to improve the balance of chemical nutrients, continued through 1991, however. 
Subsidies on imported fertilizers such as TSP and MP were not reintroduced until January 2005, 
at the rate of 35 percent. 
In spite of the liberalization in marketing, government controls and the volumes of 
imports and exports of urea have kept domestic wholesale prices of urea consistently below 
import parity border prices, though generally above export parity prices.
27 Domestic prices for 
urea averaged about 37 and 50 percent below import parity in the 1970s and 1980s, and 50 
percent in the 1990s and 2000s.
28 However, domestic prices of TSP have averaged only 18 
percent below import parity since 1990 compared to 47 percent below import parity in the 1970s 
and 1980s (Appendix Table A9).  
Given that costs of fertilizer have averaged only 5 percent of total cost of paddy (and less 
for most other crops), the fertilizer subsidy has not had a major effect on overall NRA to 
agriculture in recent years, adding only 1 to 2 percent in most years. That also applies to the main 
nontradable food, potatoes, that would otherwise have an NRA of zero. 
 
Total assistance to agriculture 
                                                 
26 Like fertilizer, irrigation water was also heavily subsidized in the early years of diffusion, with a rapid reduction 
of subsidies in the late 1970s when irrigation equipment, previously owned by the public, was privatized. Since 
1988, the government has withdrawn all restrictions on imports of irrigation equipment by the private sector, 
eliminated import duty on agricultural machinery and removed restrictions on standardization and quality control of 
machines by the public sector. These policy changes had a significant impact on the use of minor irrigation 
equipment, especially shallow tubewells, and led to a rapid expansion of irrigated area in the country (Ahmed 2001). 
27 In most years, Bangladesh has produced its own urea from domestic natural gas and began net exports of urea on 
a large scale in 1988 (Renfro 1992). 
28 Average domestic prices of urea were about 40 percent above average export parity prices from 1990-91 to 2004-
05.   
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For the Bangladesh agricultural sector as a whole, including both tradable and nontradable 
goods, the average NRA since the mid-1970s has been small. For the six covered products the 
five-year averages in Table 4 range from -8 percent when international prices were high in the 
mid-1990s to 17 percent when those prices were low in the latter 1980s. Three major factors 
drive this result. First, since rice accounts for two-thirds of covered product output, its NRA 
largely determines the total NRA for tradable Bangladesh agriculture. The product with the 
greatest price distortions, sugar cane, accounts for only 1 or 2 percent of the total value of 
domestic agricultural production in most years and so has little influence on the sector’s average 
NRA.  
Second, the implicit taxation of agricultural exports (jute and tea) partially offset 
protection for importables in the estimates of total NRA. But they have a small weight in the 
average (less than 5 pecent since the late 1980s), and so they too have little influence on the 
sector’s average NRA.  
And third, while the share of the nontradable good in Table 4, potato, is somewhat larger 
at up to 7 percent in recent years, its only measured assistance comes from fertilizer and so its 
NRA is very small.  
These estimated NRAs suggest export farm industries are discouraged heavily relative to 
import-competing farmers. This is illustrated in Figure 4. They also suggest that the dispersion of 
covered product NRAs around their mean value each year is wide and has not declined over the 
past 30 years. One measure of that, shown near the bottom of Table 4, is the standard deviation 
of those NRAs: it has averaged around 70 percent or more. This lack of convergence in NRAs, 
suggests there continues to be an inefficient allocation of land and other farm resources among 
those covered industries. 
Virtually all non-covered products, including fruits, vegetables and meat products, 
receive very little assistance and so their NRA is assumed to be zero. They are also assumed to 
be nontradable over the period under study. Including these goods, which account for about one-
quarter of the total value of agricultural production, the weighted NRA for all Bangladesh 
agriculture is even closer to zero than is the weighted average of the covered products alone 
(upper half of Table 5).   
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What is also important to agriculture’s competitiveness within the economy and ability to 
contribute to it is the extent to which non-agricultural tradable sectors are assisted by government 
policies. The combined effect of import tariffs and quotas on domestic prices of non-farm 
import-competing goods can be expressed as an implicit tariff rate, defined as the ratio of 
domestic prices (measured at the border) to import prices. In the absence of detailed data on 
domestic and import prices, we calculate estimates of that implicit tariff. The calculations 
provide a NRA for import-competing parts of the non-farm sector. When combined with an 
assumed NRA of zero for the exportable part of that sector, a production-weighted average NRA 
for non-agricultural tradables is generated. Crude though this is, it provides a reasonable measure 
that can be compared with the NRA for tradable agriculture using the relative rate of assistance 
(RRA) concept. As defined in the footnote to Table 5, the RRA shows the extent to which prices 
received by farmers are depressed relative to prices faced by producers of other tradables in the 
country. 
The lower half of Table 5 summarizes the RRA findings, with annual estimates reported 
in Appendix Table A11. These estimates reveal that even though agriculture’s NRA has been 
positive in some years, it has always been well below the NRA for non-agricultural tradables. 
Hence the RRA estimates are strongly negative, and suggest that the relative price of farm 
products has been depressed by more than one-fifth in the period since independence. Its value in 
the first half of the present decade is considerably less than the average for the 1990s, however 
(at 16 percent compared with 27 percent). Further reform in the non-farm sectors will be needed 
if the distortions in resource allocation between sectors producing tradables is to disappear so 
that the RRA line can reach the horizontal axis in Figure 5. 
 
 
Political economy of agricultural policies  
 
 
As discussed above, there has been a progressive shift in agricultural policies in Bangladesh 
towards privatization, deregulation, and a reduction of input subsidies, which began in the mid-
1970s and continued in stages up to the early 1990s. There are still government controls on  
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fertilizer and sugar production and on wholesale trade, but these are of relatively minor 
economic significance.  
The successive Bangladesh governments that formulated and implemented these policies, 
like all governments, balanced a variety of objectives against a range of constraints. In the policy 
process, pressures and counter-pressures are exerted on the government from various interest 
groups, and government responses are usually conditioned by the mutuality of interest of the 
pressure groups and the ruling elites. Sometimes there are situations where effective pressure 
groups do not exist or can be successfully set off against one another, and the state can pursue its 
own agenda – which could be purely predatory, altruistic or a blend of the two (Grindle 1991). 
Even if the reform proposals are sound on economic considerations, they need to have a 
minimum level of social and political acceptability for their implementation to be successful and 
sustainable. When this is not the case, the government may be forced to backtrack and adopt 
policies that are less satisfactory on economic grounds.
29 
In the Bangladesh context, several factors have been particularly important in 
determining the influence of various interest groups on agricultural policies and reforms since 
independence: the relative political strengths of farmers versus urban groups; academic and 
political views on socialism and capitalism; internal debates within government across 
ministries; and influences of donors.  
One of the most important facets of the political economy in Bangladesh is the relative 
weakness of farmers and the rural poor as pressure groups. Although they include a large number 
of households, their geographical dispersion, internal differentiation, ideological orientation, and 
poor resource base all contribute to making them largely ineffective politically. In contrast, the 
working class in the urban formal sector, the bureaucracy as a pressure group within the state 
apparatus, and private entrepreneurs constitute organized and powerful interest groups whom 
few governments can afford to antagonize.
30  
The weak political clout of the peasantry in Bangladesh explains why conflicts of interest 
between agriculture and industry have consistently been resolved in favor of industry. Thus, for 
                                                 
29 For an analysis of the oscillation of post-colonial regimes between “technocratic” and “populist” policies, see 
Huntington and Nelson (1976). 
30 In reforming the grain procurement and ration shop system in the early 1990s, the Government of Bangladesh was 
able to avoid direct conflict with consumer groups by reducing the price subsidy on ration shop grain slowly over 
time. Without support of consumer groups, who no longer reaped major benefits from the ration shop system, 




   
example, in the case of agro-based industrial raw materials such as jute, the policy has been to 
keep the price of the input low so that the relevant industrial product can be competitive. Export 
taxes and restrictions on export of agricultural commodities contributed to such discrimination 
against agriculture. Weak representation of the interests of the peasantry within the major 
political parties, and the predominance of trading and industrial vested interests, not only led to 
an excessively protected economic regime but also shaped the political economy of Bangladesh 
in a manner that permitted the policy regime to continue to discriminate against agriculture. Even 
in the case of policy measures such as input subsidies, farmers failed to derive much benefit as 
these were largely usurped by rent-seeking public officials in collusion with middlemen and the 
residual benefit often was more than offset by depressing the farm output price. 
Another important factor shaping agricultural and broader economic policy is the wide 
divergence of views amongst social scientists and other professionals on the issue of policy 
reform. There are critics of market mechanisms whose views were initially shaped by the 
colonial experience, interpreted as exploitation by world capitalism, plus the apparent success of 
the Soviet Union and especially China in transforming their economies, as well as the experience 
of certain blatant examples of market failure such as the Bengal Famine of 1943. The 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Chinese strides towards market economy have, in 
recent years, disillusioned many of them regarding the virtues of “planning”. Nevertheless, an 
articulate anti-market lobby still persists amongst intellectuals, who effectively counter the 
sweeping and sometimes simplistic claims for the market made by its over-zealous votaries. 
The policy process is further complicated by the fact that policy makers and 
implementers often hold divergent views on the appropriateness of particular reform measures. 
Sometimes this happens due to different social and political orientation of these two sets of 
actors. The unwillingness of the bureaucracy to relinquish the levers of control even when 
political leadership is committed to deregulation, and rivalry between ministries, may also lead 
to such outcomes. For example, the Ministry of Commerce may obstruct liberalization measures 
proposed by the Ministry of Finance.  
Finally, donors have had a major influence on government policy in Bangladesh, in part 
because of the importance of foreign aid in the development budget and for balance of payments 
support. Within agriculture, donor support in terms of funding for agricultural research, rural 
infrastructure and food aid were especially important in the 1970s and 1980s, contributing to the  
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weight of donor views in the policy process. In particular, the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank and the US Agency for International Development exerted major influence 
on the formulation and implementation of agricultural policy in Bangladesh by tying program 
loans and import credits to the policy reform agenda.  
 
Major reforms in agricultural pricing 
 
The major reforms in agricultural policy in the 1980s were heavily influenced by the policy 
perspectives of the dominant donor agencies, as outlined in papers on agricultural and food 
policy pricing prepared by the USAID and the World Bank (1979) and USAID (1982). The 
World Bank (1979) argues that the net effect of policy intervention in developing countries 
discouraged agricultural production, higher price incentives would be an important instrument 
for increasing food production, and subsidies on inputs have proved to be an inefficient way of 
protecting agriculture. The report also highlights the complexity of the effects of food prices on 
different groups and advocates a gradual rise in food prices to avoid the hardships resulting from 
an abrupt price increase. USAID (1982) likewise argues that government interventions in 
agricultural markets tend to reduce efficiency in resource allocation and inhibit gains in 
productivity and often do little for groups they are supposed to help. The report advocates 
policies which do not suppress prices to producers, do not attempt to regulate access to food for 
the majority of consumers, and instead lead to a speedy withdrawal of subsidies on agricultural 
inputs including credit. Government interventions were to be limited to agricultural research, 
building large-scale irrigation systems, and special feeding programs to combat malnutrition. 
Thus, in general donors advocated a market-oriented agricultural policy, though 
suggesting a central role for output price supports to support self-sufficiency in foodgrains,
31 an 
objective that was ultimately achieved in 2000 (Osmani and Quasem 1990).
32   
                                                 
31 Various studies of comparative advantage in Bangladesh agriculture (Mahmud, Rahman and Zohir 2000; 
Shahabuddin 2000, Shahabuddin and Dorosh 2004) demonstrate that attainment of self-sufficiency in rice 
production is not only an important socio-political objective but an eminently sensible one from strictly economic 
point of view. 
32 Government intervention in the form of domestic procurement was largely ineffective in maintaining effective 
floor prices for growers. A number of factors have contributed to the failure of domestic procurement including an 
inadequate number of procurement centers for a comprehensive coverage of the production area, cumbersome 
payment procedure which raise transaction costs for small farmers, lack of financial resources for PFDS, and 
collusion between traders and officials which enable traders to capture the margin between the market price and the 
procurement price (Shahabuddin 1996).  
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Reforms in agricultural input markets, particularly related to levels of fertilizer prices, 
generally faced more opposition. In 1973, the First Five-Year Plan of Bangladesh underscored 
the need for the eventual removal of agricultural input subsidies, and even emphasized that these 
inputs should be sold at a profit. Indeed, urea prices were raised substantially as early as in 1973. 
At the same time, sections of the bureaucracy were opposed to elimination of input subsidies and 
to privatization of fertilizer and irrigation equipment distribution. This was partly due to the 
bureaucracy’s reluctance to accept curtailment of its control and distributive powers. Misplaced 
equity concerns also contributed to the resistance put up by bureaucrats to the proposed reforms. 
Donor pressure for swiftly carrying out the reforms played a major role in quelling  opposition 
from bureaucrats. 
Fertilizer markets were further liberalized in the early 1990s, but the country witnessed a 
major crisis in the fertilizer market during 1994-95 which led to partial reversal of the reform 
process in this market. In fact, farmers became so militant that it necessitated police firing on 
them, leading to several deaths. This was in sharp contrast to the situations in 1974 when the 
famine caused little uproar in rural Bangladesh, and in 1993 when farmers paid high fertilizer 
prices without much protestation (Abdullah 1996). Unmet expectations of lower prices following 
policy reforms and a perception of injustice may explain the outrage of farmers in the mid-
1990s.
33   
The famine in 1974 had a different dynamic in the sense that it hit mainly landless 
laborers. In contrast, the fertilizer scarcity mainly affected the medium farmers, who are known 
to be more militant (Wolf 1971), and whose marketed surplus of rice is usually not large enough 
to compensate them for the higher urea prices. As the national elections were pending, the 
political parties in the opposition also tried to reap dividends from the crisis by mobilizing the 
peasantry. 
Not all reforms in agricultural input markets have been opposed by farmers, however. 
Some policy reforms seem to have benefited the majority of farmers. For example, the 
elimination of the standards requirement for irrigation equipment has been very popular among 
farmers. This policy faced opposition from public sector employees, particularly from those 
involved in government controls and imports (the Bangladesh Agricultural Development 
                                                 
33 When the issue price of fertilizer was reduced in the 1994 budget, farmers expected that they would be the major 
beneficiaries. So, their notion of a “just price” was outraged when they were required to pay prices that were nearly 
double (sometimes more) of what the middleman paid to the factory.  
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Corporation), but that did not prove to be a major road block as opposing political forces did not 
politicize the issue and the government and development partners handled the matter tactfully 






Bangladesh agriculture has undergone major structural changes and achieved major successes 
over the last three and a half decades. Despite many problems and constraints, a quiet 
agricultural revolution has taken place that has enabled the country to achieve its national food 
security foodgrain production targets. Agriculture continues to evolve in response to numerous 
factors including natural calamities, socio-political changes, population growth, urbanization, 
new technology, opportunities in the rural non-farm sector and commercialization. And 
government macroeconomic, trade and agricultural pricing policies, that have played a major 
role in shaping price incentives in production and consumption, will continue to be important 
determinants of agricultural growth as well.  
For over 30 years a central objective of government agricultural policy was self-
sufficiency in foodgrains. To achieve this objective, the government attempted to maintain 
sufficient incentives for expansion of domestic rice and wheat production through maintenance 
of remunerative output prices and fertilizer subsidies. Investments in agricultural research and 
technology that permitted large gains in productivity and a large expansion in the irrigated rice 
area were also crucial for this expansion of production. At the same time, government policy was 
designed to protect poor consumers through subsidized sales of rice (through to the early 1990s) 
and more important extensive safety nets involving food for work and food transfers, often in the 
form of wheat.  
Although trade liberalization has faced substantial opposition, Bangladesh nevertheless 
undertook major reforms in trade policy, reducing tariffs for industrial products in the 1980s and 
especially the early 1990s, and liberalizing private sector trade in rice and wheat in this latter 
period as well. As a result, domestic output prices of rice (the main agricultural product in terms 
of value) and wheat have been near border prices in most years since the early 1990s, and so  
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price distortions in Bangladesh agriculture have averaged less than 5 percent of the value of 
domestic production since 1990 in spite of remaining price distortions for a few products 
(notably sugar cane) and inputs (chemical fertilizers). Bangladesh has reaped major benefits 
from trade liberalization in terms of food security as private sector imports have helped stabilize 
markets after major production shortfalls. Keeping domestic prices of most agricultural 
commodities near border prices has also resulted in overall efficiency gains in the agricultural 
sector.  
Reducing the remaining disincentives for agricultural production – due to protection for 
non-agricultural producers – will be a necessary part of any future strategy for agricultural 
growth and rural poverty reduction. And even a liberalized trade policy of Bangladesh would not 
automatically guarantee increasing incomes for farmers. For example, the upward trend in the 
ratio of fertilizer to paddy prices in the early part of this decade, driven in part from movements 
in world prices, reduced price incentives for paddy production and contributed to lower returns 
to farmers. In 2007-08, world prices of both fertilizer and rice rose substantially, and combined 
with India’s limits on exports of rice to Bangladesh, contributed to large increases in domestic 
prices of fertilizer and rice in Bangladesh in early 2008. Policies aimed at increasing production 
and stabilizing prices need not rely mainly on price subsidies or large increases in public stocks, 
however. Instead, investments in agricultural research and extension that increase agricultural 
productivity, improvements in post-harvest management and agro-processing, and investments in 
market infrastructure can complement agricultural price and trade policies and enable rapid 
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Figure 1: Shares of covered products in value of agricultural production at distorted prices, 




































Source: Based on producer price and quantity data in FAOSTAT at www.fao.org  
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Figure 2: Rice nominal rate of assistance and border price,




























































a The Pearson correlation coefficient between these two series is -0.41 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Figure 3: Rice prices
a and private rice import volumes, Bangladesh, 1997 to 2007 




























































































































































































Private Sector Imports Dhaka Wholesale Price Import Parity(ex: Delhi)




a Import parity prices shown include taxes. 
 




   
Figure 4: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, import-competing and all agricultural 
























































































   
Figure 5: Nominal rates of assistance to all agricultural and non-agricultural tradable 
industries and relative rates of assistance,























































































t are the percentage NRAs for the tradable parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively. 
 




   
Table 1: Import tariff rates, Bangladesh, 1991 to 2003 
 
(unweighted average, percent) 
 
  All tariff lines  Industrial tariff lines  Agriculture tariff lines 
  Customs Para- Total Customs Para- Total  Customs  Para- Total
 duties  tariffs  rate duties tariffs rate  duties  tariffs rate
1991 71  3  74 70 3 73  77  0 77
1992 58  3  61 57 3 60  62  0 62
1993 43  2  46 43 3 46  46  0 45
1994 34  3  38 34 4 37  37  2 40
1995 29  3  32 28 3 32  30  2 32
1996 28  3  32 28 4 31  30  2 33
1997 27  6  33 27 6 33  29  5 35
1998 27  6  32 26 6 32  28  5 34
1990 22  7  29 22 7 29  25  5 30
2000 21  7  29 20 8 28  25  5 30
2001 21  8  29 20 8 29  25  8 33
2002 20  7  26 19 7 26  24  5 29
2003  19 10 29 18 9 27  23  17 40
 




   




Milk powder  72 74
Refined soybean oil  101 59
Refined palm oil  87 59
Sugar 135 47
Spices 80 39






Raw cotton  8 7
 
Source: World Bank (2004, p. 50)  
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Table 3: Bangladesh production and imports or rice and wheat, 1973 to 2004 
 
(kt and percent) 
 
 Rice Wheat Total
Production (kt)     
1973-78    12,255     259    12,514 
1979-88    14,501    1,085    15,586 
1989-98    18,230    1,305    19,534 
1999-2004    24,822    1,476    26,298 
  
Imports (kt)   
1973-78      216    1,292     1,507 
1979-88      308    1,655     1,963 
1989-98      660    1,363     2,022 






1973-78 2.5 81.7 12.7
1979-88 1.9 60.6 11.1
1989-98 3.6 52.1 9.9
1999-2004 3.4 59.7 9.5
 
a Net availability is estimated as production less 10 percent adjustment for seed, feed and 
wastage plus imports. Changes in public stocks are not included. 
 
Source: Economic Review and Monthly Statistical Bulletin  
 
41
   




   1974 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
         
Exportables
a  -28.7 -34.6 -26.2 -32.4 -33.0 -9.9 -33.2 
Jute -30.0 -37.1 -29.3  -35.4 -38.4 -5.6 -38.7 
Tea 1.4 -14.5 -10.7  -19.9 -11.9 -20.5 -20.4 
       
Import-competing products
a  -20.6 6.5 -1.9 24.4 -0.1 -7.9 6.1 
Rice
b -25.7 6.5 -5.2  20.4 -5.3 -12.0 2.6 
Wheat 38.9 30.3 -5.8  11.3 4.5 2.6 -0.3 
Sugar 73.7 92.1 137.0  436.0 166.1 138.8 223.9 
    
Nontradables
a          
Potato 1.3 1.5 1.3  1.7 2.2 2.7 1.8 
       
Total of covered products
a  -20.8 2.8 -3.8 16.8 -2.2 -7.6 3.9 
Dispersion of covered products
c   52.1 71.4 67.6  190.7 77.5 67.9 101.2 
% coverage (at undistorted prices)  77 77 78  72 72 70 72 
 
a Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of production.  
b Rice NRAs are calculated using the average cost of Bangladesh rice imports.  
c Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean of NRAs of covered products. 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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   1974 1975-79 1980-84  1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
NRA, covered agric products
a -20.8 2.8 -3.8  16.8 -2.2 -7.6 3.9 
NRA, non-covered agric products   0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NRA, all agricultural products
a -16.0 1.4 -3.3  11.7 -1.5 -5.2 2.7 
NRA, non-product-specific (NPS)   0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total agricultural NRA (incl. NPS)
b  -16.0 1.4 -3.3 11.7 -1.5 -5.2 2.7 
Trade bias index
c  -0.10 -0.30 -0.23   -0.45 -0.33 0.00 -0.37   
     
Assistance to just tradables:    
   All agricultural tradables  -21.6 3.1 -3.9  17.5 -2.4 -8.0 4.0 
   All non-agricultural tradables  45.9 28.4 22.4  28.5 33.3 29.0 23.4 
Relative rate of assistance, RRA
d  -46.3 -19.7 -21.5 -8.6 -26.7 -28.6 -15.8 
 
a NRAs including product-specific input subsidies. 
b NRAs including product-specific input subsidies and non-product-specific (NPS) assistance. Total of assistance to primary factors 
and intermediate inputs divided by the total value of primary agriculture production at undistorted prices (%). 
c Trade bias index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for 
the import-competing and exportable parts of the agricultural sector. 




t are the percentage NRAs for the 
tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 43 
     
Appendix: Background material, data sources and annual assistance calculations 
 
This Appendix provides details of the data sources and assistance calculations that are 
summarized in the main text of this paper. It also provides a description of the policy to promote 
exports of goods produced using imported inputs, and of policies affecting jute in the decade or so prior to 
independence in 1971. 
 
Duty free access to imported machinery and raw materials 
 
In order to promote exports of goods produced using imported inputs, Bangladesh has implemented various 
schemes to provide duty free access to these inputs since the 1970s, particularly for export industries in the 
textile sector. Initially, duty drawbacks (refunds) were based on actual duties paid. In 1979, a flat rate system 
was introduced under which the drawbacks was calculated on the basis of predetermined input-output 
coefficients and periodic calculations of the average percentage of value of customs, excise duties and sales 
tax for a product or product group. Beginning in 1983, drawback payments were allowed to be paid through 
the exporter's bank in the form of an interest free 90-day advance.  
  Duty drawbacks were further extended in 1982 under the Notional System of Duty Payments for 
time-sensitive goods such as readymade garments which permitted the exporter to clear imported inputs 
without actually paying any duty or sales tax. Under this system, the item-wise value of imports was recorded 
and a suspense account for the duties and taxes payable thereon was established. Once proof of exports was 
provided, the liability to pay the amounts in suspense was removed. In 1987, the drawback scheme was 
extended to indirect exporters (firms selling inputs to 100 percent exporting firms). 
  In parallel with duty drawbacks, a system of private bonded warehouse was put in place in the early 
1970s under which firms producing exclusively for export could import and stock duty free inputs under 
supervision by a custom official. However, issuance of licenses for such warehouses was stopped later 
because of various irregularities. The special bonded warehouse scheme was first introduced for the 
readymade garments industry in 1978. The exporters entitled to this facility had the option of choosing the 
duty drawback system or avail a straight authorization to import duty free into established special bonded 
warehouses. The scheme is monitored through the use of import and export passbooks and pre-set input-
output coefficients. Until 1993, special bonded warehouses were available only to exporters in the garment 
industries using back-to-back lines of credit, and to suppliers that sell all of their output to garment exporters. 
In 1993, the special bonded warehouse facility was extended to all exporters and “deemed exporters”. 
  To provide incentives for use of local fabrics in garment exports, a cash compensatory scheme 
administered by the Bangladesh Bank was introduced in 1986. This scheme provided cash assistance of 
15 percent of fob export value to exporters using local fabric. This facility was made available to 
readymade garments, hosiery and specialized textiles units that were either not covered by or chose not to 
use the bonded warehouse and duty drawback facilities. The rate of compensation was revised upward 
from 15 percent to 25 percent in 1994 and has been brought down to 10 percent in recent years. 
  The coverage of cash assistance was extended over time and the extent of subsidy also varied from 
product to product. Agricultural exports included in the cash assistance scheme are frozen shrimp and fish, 
tobacco and potato (10 percent of the fob value of exports) and crushed bone and hatching eggs for poultry 
and day old chicks (15 percent of the fob value of exports).  
  For further details see Rahman (1992). 
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Agricultural trade and price policies in East Pakistan pre-1971 
 
Agricultural trade and price incentives in East Pakistan through to 1971 were heavily influenced 
by overall trade and macro-economic considerations of united Pakistan.
34 During the 1950s and 
1960s, Pakistan followed an import-substitution trade strategy that involved taxation of 
agricultural exports and protection of domestic industry through import tariffs. It also tended to 
avoid currency devaluations and instead rely on quantitative controls on imports to limit 
effective demand for foreign exchange at the official exchange rate.
35  
In the early 1950s, Pakistan introduced quantitative import controls through a system of 
import licenses to favor use of foreign exchange for capital and intermediate goods and limit 
imports of consumer goods. At the same time, cotton and jute exports were taxed through export 
duties. Overvaluation of the Pakistan rupee, combined with these explicit export taxes, 
contributed to a 70 percent decline in the real value of total exports between 1952 and 1958 
(Dorosh and Valdes 1990, p. 15).  
In 1959, the government introduced the export bonus scheme in an effort to spur export 
earnings. Under this scheme, exporters of manufactured products were awarded export bonus 
vouchers at specified percentages of the f.o.b. value of their exports which could be used to 
purchase otherwise restricted items from the import “bonus list”. The bonus voucher scheme 
represented an effective devaluation of the exchange rate for exports receiving vouchers and for 
imports purchased with these vouchers. Thus in the early 1960s, for example, bonus vouchers 
with a face value of 20 to 40 percent of the export value (early 1960s) were given to exporters of 
most non-agricultural products. To purchase 100 rupees of imports from a list of 260 items 
required a bonus voucher with face value of 100 rupees, in addition to the official cost of foreign 
exchange. There was also a premium on vouchers on the Karachi Stock Exchange, (i.e. the 
market value of the vouchers exceeded their face value). As a result, the effective exchange rate 
for bonus list imports was more than double the official exchange rate (World Bank 1963).  
Jute (and manufactured jute products) was by far the major export of East Pakistan’s 
economy, accounting for about two-thirds of total export earnings in the late 1960s.  Prior to the 
partition of British India in 1947, India accounted for 96 percent of world raw jute production 
and most of world raw jute exports. After partition, all 108 jute mills were located in India, while 
71 percent of jute growing areas were in East Pakistan (World Bank 1975). In 1948-49, India 
launched the “Grow More Jute” campaign, a program which included subsidized seeds and 
fertilizers, in an effort to provide more raw jute for its jute mills. United Pakistan, too, supported 
development of its jute industry in its 6-year Development Program of 1951-57 through 
preferential access to capital, tax concessions, and export incentives. East Pakistan established its 
first jute mill in 1951, and by 1958 had 14 jute mills.  
The war between East and West Pakistan in 1971 completely stopped jute mill 
production in East Pakistan. After the war, the new government nationalized 44 of the 77 mills as 
“abandoned property”.
36 Later the remaining 33 mills, owned by Bengalis, were also 
nationalized. A holding company, the Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation (renamed Bang Jute 
                                                 
34 From March 1971 (when East Pakistan/Bangladesh declared its independence) until December 1971 (when the 
war with West Pakistan ended), the government of Pakistan still set policies for East Pakistan. 
35 See Lewis and Guisinger (1971) and Islam (1969, 1981) for detailed discussions of trade and exchange rate policy 
in Pakistan in this period. 
36 Most manufacturing in East Pakistan, including jute milling, was controlled by non-Bengalis.    45 
     
Industries Corporation when the entire industry was nationalized) was also created to run the 
mills. 
Under the Bonus Export scheme, raw jute exports faced a high rate of implicit taxation, 
even relative to exports of manufactured jute products. In the early 1960s, raw jute exports were 
subject to a small export tax ranging from 7 to 13 percent. Moreover, exports of jute (as well as 
tea, raw cotton and other major agricultural export products) did not earn bonus vouchers. Thus, 
the effective exchange rate for jute exports ranged from Rs/US$ 4.2 to 4.8 in the 1960s. By 
contrast, exports of jute manufactured products (mainly sacks and hessian) earned bonus 
vouchers, faced no export taxes, and benefited from the implicit taxation on raw jute (the main 
input into jute manufactured products). The effective exchange on manufactured jute exports 
ranged from Rs/$ 5.5 to 7.3 over the same period. Assuming that raw jute accounted for 50 
percent of the value of jute manufactured exports (fob), the effective rate of protection for 
manufactured jute products thus ranged from 47 to 107 percent in the 1960s (Repetto 1972). 
The high implicit taxation of raw jute reduced domestic prices and production incentives, 
leading to lower levels of exports and higher world prices. To some degree, this policy may have 
facilitated the development and adoption of synthetic fibers that ultimately replaced jute in many 
markets. Value added in jute milling in East Pakistan was low in the late 1960s, but profits were 
high because of the export bonus scheme (World Bank 1975). 
The implicit taxation on raw jute was even higher when compared to measures of the 
average effective exchange rate for exports, the average effective exchange rate for imports or 
the implicit effective exchange rate for imports (taking into account the effect of quantitative 
restrictions). The implicit taxation of raw jute relative to all of Pakistan’s exports from 1959 to 
1971 averaged 44 percent. Compared to the average effective exchange rate for imports, the 
implicit taxation of raw jute averaged about 40 percent during 1965-1971 (calculated as the sum 
of the total import value in dollars converted to rupees at the official exchange rate, the value of 
bonus vouchers and the actual value of import taxes collected, divided by the total import value 
in dollars). Taking into the account the implicit taxation of imports (calculated as the domestic 
value of imports as derived from actual domestic market prices divided by the total import value 
in dollars), which averaged 173 percent from 1959 to 1971, the relative taxation on jute exports 
was 65 percent. 
Since raw jute accounted for about one-third of the total value of exports of East Pakistan 
(about 20 percent of total Pakistan exports) and about 10 percent of agricultural value added in 
East Pakistan at actual prices (about 15 percent of value added using undistorted border prices), 
this export taxation represented a sizeable taxation of agriculture, equivalent to an average of 
about 7 percent of agricultural GDP in the 1960s.  Including distortions on tea, (which had a 
value of production of only about one-tenth that of jute in the period), the total distortions on 
these two major agricultural exports was equivalent to about 8 percent of GDP over the 1960s.  
It should also be noted that this taxation of East Pakistan’s agriculture had major 
implications for implicit fiscal transfers between East and West Pakistan, since apart from jute 
textiles, there was no other major manufacturing industry in East Pakistan. Thus, trade policy not 
only benefited industry at the expense of agriculture but also heavily favored West Pakistan 
relative to East Pakistan.  
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Bangladesh Food Planning and Monitoring 
Unit (FPMU).  
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Exports Export Price Logarithmic Trend Export Price Export Trend
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Bangladesh Handbook of Agricultural 
Statistics. 
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Appendix Table A1: Real growth of population, total GDP, agricultural GDP and GDP per 
capita, Bangladesh, 1980 to 2004 
 
 (percent per year) 
 
 
  Population   GDP   Per Capita GDP 
1980–84  2.14 3.16 1.02 
1985–89  2.20 3.59 1.39 
1990–94  1.98 4.20 2.22 
1995–99  1.60 4.95 3.35 




 Crops  Livestock Forestry Fishing All  agric, 
forestry 
and fishing 
1980–84 2.8  2.0 4.0 3.4 2.9 
1985–89 1.4  2.2 2.2 1.5 1.6 
1990–94 2.2  2.4 2.8 8.0 1.7 
1995–99 2.2  2.6 4.5 8.6 4.8 
2000–04 1.5  4.8 4.6 1.7 2.5 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculation using data from Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) Statistical 
Yearbook, and Ministry of Finance Bangladesh Economic Review (2005). 
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Appendix Table A2: Sub-sectoral shares of GDP and composition of agricultural value-added, 





1980 1984 1989  1994  1999  2004   
Share of total GDP   
Crops 21.0 20.6 17.5 16.1  13.8  12.7
Livestock 4.2 4.0 3.8 3.4  3.0  2.8
Forestry   2.2 2.4 2.1 1.9  1.8  1.8
Fishing 4.9 4.8 4.4 4.9  5.7  4.9
Total 32.3 31.6 27.8 26.3  24.3  22.1
  Share of Agricultural GDP   
Crops 64.9 65.0 63.0 61.2  56.7  57.3
Livestock 13.1 12.5 13.5 12.8  12.3  12.6
Forestry   6.9 7.5 7.6 7.3  7.5  7.9
Fishing 15.0 15.1 15.9 18.7  23.5  22.1
Crops 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0
 
a The sub-sectoral shares in both total GDP and agricultural GDP are based on new GDP series 
published by the BBS, which is available from 1980. 
 
Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 
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       All  agric  Total
 Jute Tea Shrimp exports  exports
Growth (% p.a. real)
a         
1973-79 -4.2  8.5 41.1 1.1  3.8
1979- 89  -4.1  -2.8 13.3 2.1  6.2
1989- 99  -9.0  -4.3 9.6 4.7  14.0
1999-2004 3.9  -7.2 1.3 3.6  4.9
          
1973-2004 -5.2  -4.1 10.5 1.4  8.4
          
         Agric 
share
  Share of agricultural exports (percent)  of total
1973-79 69.5  17.1 9.2 100.0  37.3
1979- 89  41.5  16.0 35.0 100.0  29.9
1989- 99  19.9  9.4 60.0 100.0  12.1
1999-2004 15.3  3.5 70.2 100.0  7.2
          
1973-2004 36.8  12.2 42.7 100.0  22.4
 
(b) Imports 
       All  agric  Total
 Wheat Cotton Edible  oil imports
a imports
Growth rates (% p.a. real)
a        
1973-79 -12.6 2.8 4.8 -6.1  6.0
1979- 89  -1.8 -2.8 6.0 1.3  1.7
1989- 99  -2.6 11.5 2.9 6.7  9.0
1999-2004 3.6 15.0 12.8 10.2  7.1
          
1973-2004 -2.9 4.5 3.2 2.1  4.9
          
         Agric  share
  Share of agricultural imports
 (percent)
b  of total (%)
1973-79 51.0 15.6 20.0 100.0  32.9
1979- 89  42.4 13.1 18.5 100.0  23.6
1989- 99  24.5 15.8 21.4 100.0  16.9
1999-2004 14.4 28.7 21.7 100.0  15.5
          
1973-2004 34.3 16.9 20.2 100.0  22.3
 
a Growth rates are for values in 2004-05 US dollars, using the US wholesale price index as a deflator. 
b Other major agricultural imports are rice, sugar, milk and cream, pulses, spices, oilseeds and tobacco. 
 
Source: Bangladesh Export Promotion Bureau, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics and authors’ calculations. 51 
     






























1973 128  15  5  3  0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0  2  153  372  41 
1974  92  24  3  2  0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0  2  122  383  32 
1975  127 18 11  1  0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  4  160  381 42 
1976  118 37 18  1  0  0.0  0.1  0.4  0.0  5  179  417 43 
1977  97 45 20  1  1  0.0  0.0  1.2  0.0  5  170  494 34 
1978  145 41 35  2  0  0.0  0.0  1.3  0.0 11  236  619 38 
1979  148 34 38  2  1  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.0  7  231  749 31 
1980  119 41 40  2  1  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  7  209  710 29 
1981  102 38 53  2  2  0.1  2.0  0.5  0.0 13  211  626 34 
1982  110 47 72  2  2  0.2  2.3  0.6  0.0  8  243  687 35 
1983  117 69 77  2  3  0.2  3.3  0.2  0.0  9  282  811 35 
1984  151 61 87  3  4  0.3  2.6  0.5  0.0  8  317  934 34 
1985  124 33  113  5 14  0.8  0.7  0.4  0.0  8  299  819 37 
1986  104 30  134  4 18  0.3  1.3  0.1  0.0  7  298  1074 28 
1987  81 39  140  5 15  0.8  0.8  0.2  0.0  6  287  1231 23 
1988  97  40  141  7  9 0.5 1.7 0.6 0.0  4  301  1292  23 
1989 125  39  138  9  8 0.7 1.5 0.0 0.0  2  323  1524  21 
1990 104  43  142  7  4 1.3 1.6 0.0 0.0  3  306  1718  18 
1991  86  32  131  5  6 0.7 2.2 0.1 0.0  6  268  1994  13 
1992  74 41  165  9  8  1.3  1.8  0.0  0.0 13  314  2383 13 
1993  57 38  211 12  8  1.3  3.1  0.5  0.3 16  347  2534 14 
1994  80 33  306 10  9  2.0  0.1  0.1  0.0 13  452  3473 13 
1995  91 33  314  5 15  3.4  1.2  0.0  0.0 15  476  3884 12 
1996  116 38  321  7 25  0.6  1.7  0.0  0.1 17  526  4427 12 
1997  11 48  294  9 33  0.0  4.6  0.0  0.0  104  502  5172 10 
1998  72 39  274 12 18  0.0  2.5  0.1  0.0  6  422  5324  8 
1999  72 18  344 12 14  0.0  2.1  0.0  0.0  7  469  5752  8 
2000  67 22  363 10 13  0.0  2.6  0.0  0.1  6  484  6467  7 
2001  61 17  276  5 15  0.0  5.1  0.0  0.2 11  390  5986  7 
2002  82 15  322  7 13  0.0  6.7  0.2  0.4 16  462  6548  7 
2003  80 16  390  9 25  0.1  8.5  0.1  1.9 23  553  7603  7 
2004  96 16  421 12 43  3.1  17.9  0.0  4.2 35  648  8655  7 (US$million) 
(b) Imports 
  




Rice Sugar Milk 
and 
cream
Pulses Spices Oil 
seed




1973  368 80 37 28 8          
1974  422 56 163 55 1          
1975  163 16 34 61 4  0        
1976  52 38 65 9 3  6        
1977  218 142 75 70 1  19         
1978  174 68 102 7 1  3        
1979  366 94 129 141 34  24         
1980  210 108 92 40 19  37  4 11  1  
1981  239 79 71 46 25  26  5 5 2  
1982  289 56 83 97 2  36  4 5 0  
1983  342 125 87 56 2  38  7 2 1  
1984  322 106 103 176 22  65  9 6 1  
1985  212 52 136 8 9  62 1 6 0 0 21
1986  223 45 115 50 19  69 1 8 25 3 22
1987  339 88 176 150 33  73 16 17 39 5 31
1988  357 93 170 17 3  103 22 13 11 5 25
1989  241 105 200 102 10  88 60 13 14 3 23
1990  327 93 208 4 31  78 27 22 1 3 22
1991  251 95 185 4 2  69 15 38 30 7 20
1992  176 91 113 0 24  73 16 26 35 8 14
1993  145 71 140 23 26  45 31 22 65 10 14
1994  256 135 220 220 51  42 11 16 80 5 18
1995  228 185 179 358 11  52 16 22 89 13 17
1996  156 195 216 28 58  68 61 12 62 20 12
1997  122 207 216 247 44  56 59 11 93 21 14
1998  317 233 287 680 42  58 63 13 100 12 23
1999  266 277 256 115 100  81 105 10 90 21 15
2000  177 360 218 172 76  85 79 6 64 16 14
2001  171 312 251 15 35  63 77 7 72 14 12
2002  198 393 364 211 100  64 101 33 64 20 16
2003  287 583 471 144 133  66 131 37 73  28 18
2004  312 666 440 262 239  156 111 35 86  14 18
 
Sources: Export Promotion Bureau, Economic Review and Monthly Statistical Bulletin (various 
issues) 53 
     
Appendix Table A5: Food aid and other imports of wheat and rice, Bangladesh, 1973 to 
2004 
 
 (a) wheat 
 
Import of wheat (million metric tons)   
Food-aid Other  import  Total 
Food-aid as % of 
all wheat imports 
1973  0.63 0.90 1.53 41
1974  0.81 1.39 2.20 37
1975  0.46 0.58 1.04 44
1976  0.49 0.11 0.60 82
1977  0.85 0.49 1.34 63
1978  1.06 0.04 1.10 96
1979  1.34 0.73 2.07 65
1980  0.73 0.26 0.99 74
1981  1.11 0.00 1.11 100
1982  0.85 0.68 1.53 56
1983  1.32 0.56 1.88 70
1984  1.18 0.72 1.90 62
1985  1.06 0.10 1.16 91
1986  1.32 0.19 1.51 87
1987  1.6 0.73 2.33 69
1988  1.32 0.76 2.08 64
1989  0.91 0.32 1.23 74
1990  1.53 0.04 1.57 98
1991  1.38 0.15 1.53 91
1992  0.72 0.44 1.16 62
1993  0.65 0.24 0.89 73
1994  0.94 0.82 1.76 54
1995  0.74 0.55 1.29 57
1996  0.61 0.32 0.93 65
1997  0.55 0.30 0.85 65
1998  1.18 1.25 2.43 49
1999  0.87 0.80 1.67 52
2000  0.46 0.53 0.99 47
2001  0.50 1.17 1.67 30
2002  0.25 1.41 1.66  15
2003  0.29 1.69 1.98  15
2004  0.26 1.82 2.08  13
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Appendix Table A5 (continued): Food aid and other imports of wheat and rice, 
Bangladesh, 1973 to 2004 
 
 (b) rice 
 
Import of rice (kt)   
Food-aid Other  Import  Total 
Food-aid as % of 
all rice imports 
1973 0 82 82  0
1974 29 237 266  11
1975 71 325 396  18
1976 40 152 192  21
1977 21 283 304  7
1978 50 4 54  93
1979 24 688 712  3
1980 19 65 84  23
1981 30 114 144  21
1982 131 186 317  41
1983 117 62 179  65
1984 125 570 695  18
1985 27 10 37  73
1986 108 150 258  42
1987 192 398 590  33
1988 40 21 61  66
1989 41 258 299  14
1990 10 0 10  100
1991 39 0 39  100
1992 19 0 19  100
1993 0 74 74  0
1994 0 813 813  0
1995 1 1137 1138  0
1996 10 24 34  29
1997 0 1105 1105  0
1998 60 3007 3067  2
1999 5 428 433  1
2000 32 529 561  6
2001 8 118 126  6
2002 4 1552 1556  0
2003 4 796 800  1
2004 27 1268 1295  2
 
 
Source: Bangladesh Food Planning and Monitoring Unit (FPMU), Ministry of Food.55 
     
Appendix Table A6: Entitlements under XPL/XPB for exports of agricultural 
commodities, Bangladesh, 1975 to 1986 
(percent) 
Item  1975 1976 1977 1982 1986 
Frozen, salted & dehydrated fish  20  20  30  80  100 
Frozen shrimp & fish  Nil  Nil  20 80  100 
Shark fins & fish maws  Nil  15  20  80  100 
Fruits & vegetables including potato  10  15  20  80  100 
Frozen  frog  legs  20 25 20 60  100 
Curry powder, spice powder  10  20  30  80  100 
Turmeric and chili   10 15 30 80  100 
Honey  Nil 20 30 60  100 
Tobacco  leaves  Nil 10 20 80  100 
Tea  in  packets  25 30 30 80  100 
Coir & coir products  Nil  20  20  80  100 
Comilla  cotton  Nil 15 20 80  100 
Cotton  waste  Nil 15 20 40  100 
Rice & wheat bran  Nil  Nil  10 80  100 
Tamarind & tamarind seed  Nil  Nil  Nil  80  100 
Betel leaves  Nil  Nil  Nil  80  100 
Oil cake  Nil  Nil  Nil  80  70 
Cut flower  Nil  Nil  Nil  Nil  100 
Loose tea  Nil  Nil  Nil  Nil  40 
 
Source: Rahman (1994)56 
     
Appendix Table A7: Import tariffs on major agricultural imports, Bangladesh, 1991 to 2003 
(percent) 
(a) 1991 
H.S. Code  Item 
CD SD  VAT  AIT LF  DSC 
Tax 
Incidence 
0402.10.20 Milk  powder  40  0  15  2.5  2.5    66.0 
0713.40.10 Lentils  20  0  0  2.5  2.5    25.0 
0904.11.00 Pepper  60  0  0  2.5  2.5    65.0 
0904.20.10 Dried  chili  0  0  0  2.5  2.5    5.0 
0907.00.10 Clove  60  0  0  2.5  2.5    65.0 
0908.10.10 Nutmeg  54  0  0  2.5  2.5    59.0 
0908.30.10 Cardamom  60  0  0  2.5  2.5    65.0 
0909.20.10 Coriander  60  0  0  2.5  2.5    65.0 
0909.30.10 Cumin  60  0  0  2.5  2.5    65.0 
0910.10.10 Ginger  30  0  0  2.5  2.5    35.0 
1001.10.10 Wheat  7.5  0  0  0  0    7.5 
1006.30.00 Rice  30  0  0  2.5  2.5    35.0 
1205.00.11 Rape  seed  20  0  0  0  2.5    22.5 
1507.10.10 
Crude 
Soyabean oil  40  0  15  2.5  2.5    66.0 
1507.90.90 
Refined 
Soyabean  oil 100 0 15  2.5 0    132.5 
1511.10.00  Crude palm oil  50  0  15  0  2.5    75.0 
1511.90.90 
Refined palm 
oil 60  0  15  0  2.5    86.5 
1701.91.00 Sugar  100  0  15  2.5  2.5    135.0 
2401.10.10 Tobacco               
5201.00.10 Raw  cotton  10  0  0  0  0    10.0 
 Average  47.9            57.1 
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Appendix Table A7 (continued): Import tariffs on major agricultural imports, Bangladesh, 




H.S. Code  Item 
CD SD  VAT  AIT LF  DSC 
Tax 
Incidence 
0402.10.20 Milk  powder  45  0  15  2.5  2.5    71.8 
0713.40.10 Lentils  15  0  0  2.5  2.5    20.0 
0904.11.00 Pepper  75  0  0  2.5  2.5    80.0 
0904.20.10 Dried  chili  30  0  0  2.5  2.5    35.0 
0907.00.10 Clove  60  0  0  2.5  2.5    65.0 
0908.10.10 Nutmeg  60  0  0  2.5  2.5    65.0 
0908.30.10 Cardamom  75  0  0  2.5  2.5    80.0 
0909.20.10 Coriander  60  0  0  2.5  2.5    65.0 
0909.30.10 Cumin  75  0  0  2.5  2.5    80.0 
0910.10.10 Ginger  30  0  15  2.5  2.5    54.5 
1001.10.10 Wheat  7.5  0  0  0  0    7.5 
1006.30.00 Rice  60  0  15  2.5  2.5    89.0 
1205.00.11 Rape  seed  15  0  0  2.5  2.5    20.0 
1507.10.10 
Crude 
Soyabean oil  40  0  15  2.5  2.5    66.0 
1507.90.90 
Refined 
Soyabean oil  75  0  15  0  0    101.3 
1511.10.00  Crude palm oil  50  0  15  0  2.5    75.0 
1511.90.90 
Refined palm 
oil 60  0  15  2.5  0    86.5 
1701.91.00 Sugar  100  0  15  2.5  2.5    135.0 
2401.10.10 Tobacco  7.5    15  2.5  2.5    28.6 
5201.00.10 Raw  cotton  7.5  0  0  0  0    7.5 
 Average  47.4            61.6 
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Appendix Table A7 (continued): Import tariffs on major agricultural imports, Bangladesh, 




H.S. Code  Item 
CD SD  VAT  AIT LF  DSC 
Tax 
Incidence 
0402.10.20 Milk  powder  45  0  15  2.5  2.5    71.8 
0713.40.10 Lentils  15  0  0  2.5  2.5    20.0 
0904.11.00 Pepper  45  0  0  2.5  2.5    50.0 
0904.20.10 Dried  chili  30  0  0  2.5  2.5    35.0 
0907.00.10 Clove  60  0  0  2.5  2.5    65.0 
0908.10.10 Nutmeg  60  0  0  2.5  2.5    65.0 
0908.30.10 Cardamom  75  0  0  2.5  2.5    80.0 
0909.20.10 Coriander  60  0  0  2.5  2.5    65.0 
0909.30.10 Cumin  75  0  0  2.5  2.5    80.0 
0910.10.10 Ginger  60  0  0  2.5  2.5    65.0 
1001.10.10 Wheat  15  0  0  0  0    15.0 
1006.30.00 Rice  7.5  0  0  2.5  2.5    12.5 
1205.00.11 Rape  seed  15  0  0  2.5  2.5    20.0 
1507.10.10 
Crude 
Soyabean oil  30  10  15  2.5  2.5    66.0 
1507.90.90 
Refined 
Soyabean oil  45  5  15  2.5  2.5    77.5 
1511.10.00  Crude palm oil  45  5  15  2.5  2.5    77.5 
1511.90.90 
Refined palm 
oil 75  0  15  2.5  2.5    106.3 
1701.91.00 Sugar  60  0  15  2.5  2.5    89.0 
2401.10.10 Tobacco  7.5  0  15  2.5  2.5    28.6 
5201.00.10 Raw  cotton  3.75  0  0  0  0    3.8 
 Average  41.4            54.6 
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Appendix Table A7 (continued): Import tariffs on major agricultural imports, Bangladesh, 




H.S. Code  Item 
CD SD  VAT  AIT LF  DSC 
Tax 
Incidence 
0402.10.20 Milk  powder  45  0  15  2.5  2.5    71.8 
0713.40.10 Lentils  15  0  0  2.5  2.5    20.0 
0904.11.00 Pepper  45  0  0  2.5  2.5    50.0 
0904.20.10 Dried  chili  30  0  15  2.5  2.5    54.5 
0907.00.10 Clove  60  0  0  2.5  2.5    65.0 
0908.10.10 Nutmeg  60  0  0  2.5  2.5    65.0 
0908.30.10 Cardamom  60  15  0  2.5  2.5    80.0 
0909.20.10 Coriander  60  15  0  2.5  2.5    80.0 
0909.30.10 Cumin  60  15  0  2.5  2.5    80.0 
0910.10.10 Ginger  30  0  0  2.5  2.5    35.0 
1001.10.10 Wheat  15  0  0  2.5  2.5    20.0 
1006.30.00 Rice  7.5  0  0  2.5  2.5    12.5 
1205.00.11 Rape  seed  15  0  0  2.5  2.5    20.0 
1507.10.10 
Crude 
Soyabean oil  30  0  15  2.5  2.5    54.5 
1507.90.90 
Refined 
Soyabean oil  45  0  15  2.5  2.5    71.8 
1511.10.00  Crude palm oil  45  0  15  2.5  2.5    71.8 
1511.90.90 
Refined palm 
oil 60  0  15  2.5  2.5    89.0 
1701.91.00 Sugar  30  0  15  2.5  2.5    54.5 
2401.10.10 Tobacco  15  0  15  2.5  2.5    37.3 
5201.00.10 Raw  cotton  0  0  0  2.5  0    2.5 
 Average  36.4            51.8 
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Appendix Table A7 (continued): Import tariffs on major agricultural imports, Bangladesh, 




H.S. Code  Item 
CD SD  VAT  AIT LF  DSC 
Tax 
Incidence 
0402.10.20 Milk  powder  45  0  15  2.5  2.5    71.8 
0713.40.10 Lentils  7.5  0  0  2.5  2.5    12.5 
0904.11.00 Pepper  45  0  0  2.5  2.5    50.0 
0904.20.10 Dried  chili  30  0  0  2.5  2.5    35.0 
0907.00.10 Clove  45  15  0  2.5  0    62.5 
0908.10.10 Nutmeg  45  15  0  2.5  0    62.5 
0908.30.10 Cardamom  45  30  0  2.5  2.5    80.0 
0909.20.10 Coriander  45  30  0  2.5  2.5    80.0 
0909.30.10 Cumin  45  30  0  2.5  2.5    80.0 
0910.10.10 Ginger  30  0  0  2.5  2.5    35.0 
1001.10.10 Wheat  7.5  0  0  2.5  2.5    12.5 
1006.30.00 Rice  0  0  0  2.5  0    2.5 
1205.00.11 Rape  seed  7.5  0  0  2.5  2.5    12.5 
1507.10.10 
Crude 
Soyabean oil  30  0  15  2.5  2.5    54.5 
1507.90.90 
Refined 
Soyabean oil  45  0  15  2.5  0    69.3 
1511.10.00  Crude palm oil  30  0  15  0  0    49.5 
1511.90.90 
Refined palm 
oil 45  0  15  2.5  2.5    71.8 
1701.91.00 Sugar  30  0  15  2.5  2.5    54.5 
2401.10.10 Tobacco  15  0  15  2.5  2.5    37.3 
5201.00.10 Raw  cotton  0  0  0  2.5  0    2.5 
 Average  29.6            46.80 
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Appendix Table A7 (continued): Import tariffs on major agricultural imports, Bangladesh, 




H.S. Code  Item 
CD SD  VAT  AIT LF  DSC 
Tax 
Incidence 
0402.10.20 Milk  powder  45  0  15  0  0  0  66.8 
0713.40.10 Lentils  7.5  0  0  2.5  2.5  0  12.5 
0904.11.00 Pepper  45  0  0  2.5  2.5  0  50.0 
0904.20.10 Dried  chili  30  0  0  2.5  2.5  0  35.0 
0907.00.10 Clove  45  15  0  2.5  2.5  0  65.0 
0908.10.10 Nutmeg  45  15  0  2.5  2.5  0  65.0 
0908.30.10 Cardamom  45  30  0  2.5  0  0  77.5 
0909.20.10 Coriander  45  15  15  2.5  0  0  86.5 
0909.30.10 Cumin  45  30  0  2.5  2.5  0  80.0 
0910.10.10 Ginger  30  0  0  2.5  2.5  0  35.0 
1001.10.10 Wheat  7.5  0  0  2.5  2.5  0  12.5 
1006.30.00 Rice  0  0  0  2.5  0  0  2.5 
1205.00.11 Rape  seed  7.5  0  0  2.5  0  0  10.0 
1507.10.10 
Crude 
Soyabean oil  30  0  15  2.5  0  0  52.0 
1507.90.90 
Refined 
Soyabean oil  45  0  15  2.5  0  0  69.3 
1511.10.00  Crude palm oil  30  0  15  0  2.5  0  52.0 
1511.90.90 
Refined palm 
oil 45  0  15  0  2.5  0  69.3 
1701.91.00 Sugar  30  0  15  2.5  2.5  0  54.5 
2401.10.10 Tobacco  15  0  15  2.5  2.5  0  37.3 
5201.00.10 Raw  cotton  0  0  0  2.5  0  0  2.5 
 Average  29.6            46.75 
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Appendix Table A7 (continued): Import tariffs on major agricultural imports, Bangladesh, 




H.S. Code  Item 
CD SD  VAT AIT  LF  DSC 
Tax 
Incidence 
0402.10.20 Milk  powder  40  2.5  15  3  2.5  2.5  73.0 
0713.40.10 Lentils  7.5  0  0  3  2.5  2.5  15.5 
0904.11.00 Pepper  40  0  0  3  2.5  2.5  48.0 
0904.20.10 Dried  chili  15  0  0  3  2.5  2.5  23.0 
0907.00.10 Clove  40  30  0  3  2.5  2.5  90.0 
0908.10.10 Nutmeg  40  15  0  3  2.5  2.5  69.0 
0908.30.10 Cardamom  40  30  0  3  2.5  2.5  90.0 
0909.20.10 Coriander  40  30  0  3  2.5  2.5  90.0 
0909.30.10 Cumin  40  30  0  3  2.5  2.5  90.0 
0910.10.10 Ginger  30  0  0  3  2.5  2.5  38.0 
1001.10.10 Wheat  7.5  0  0  3  2.5  2.5  15.5 
1006.30.00  Rice  0 0  0 3 2.5 0  5.5 
1205.00.11 Rape  seed  7.5  0  0  3  2.5  2.5  15.5 
1507.10.10 
Crude Soyabean 
oil  15  0  15  0 0  2.5 34.8 
1507.90.90 
Refined 
Soyabean oil  40  0  15  3  2.5  2.5  69.0 
1511.10.00  Crude palm oil  15  0  15  0  0  2.5  34.8 
1511.90.90 
Refined palm 
oil 40  0  15  3  2.5  2.5  69.0 
1701.91.00 Sugar  30  0  15  3  2.5  2.5  57.5 
2401.10.10 Tobacco  15  0  15  3  2.5  2.5  40.3 
5201.00.10 Raw  cotton  0  0  0  0  0  2.5  2.5 
  Average  25.1         48.5 
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Appendix Table A7 (continued): Import tariffs on major agricultural imports, Bangladesh, 




H.S. Code  Item 
CD SD VAT  AIT  LF  DSC 
Tax 
Incidence 
0402.10.20 Milk  powder  37.5  0  15  3  2.5  2.5  66.1 
0713.40.10 Lentils  5.0  0  0  3  2.5  2.5  13.0 
0904.11.00 Pepper  37.5  0  0  3  2.5  2.5  45.5 
0904.20.10 Dried  chili  37.5  0  15  3  2.5  2.5  66.1 
0907.00.10 Clove  37.5  15  0  3  2.5  2.5  66.1 
0908.10.10 Nutmeg  37.5  15  0  3  2.5  2.5  66.1 
0908.30.10 Cardamom  37.5  30  0  3  2.5  2.5  86.8 
0909.20.10 Coriander  37.5  30  0  3  2.5  2.5  86.8 
0909.30.10 Cumin  37.5  30  0  3  2.5  2.5  86.8 
0910.10.10 Ginger  25.0  0  0  3  2.5  2.5  33.0 
1001.10.10 Wheat  5.0  0  0  3  2.5  2.5  13.0 
1006.30.00 Rice  5.0  0  0  0  0  0  5.0 
1205.00.11 Rape  seed  5.0  0  0  3  0  2.5  10.5 
1507.10.10 
Crude 
Soyabean oil  15.0  0  15  0  0  2.5  34.8 
1507.90.90 
Refined 
Soyabean oil  37.5  0  15  3  2.5  2.5  66.1 
1511.10.00  Crude palm oil  15.0  0  15  3  0  2.5  37.8 
1511.90.90 
Refined palm 
oil 25.0  0  15  3  2.5  2.5  51.8 
1701.91.00 Sugar  25.0  0  15  3  2.5  2.5  51.8 
2401.10.10 Tobacco  15.0  0  15  3  2.5  2.5  40.3 
5201.00.10 Raw  cotton  0.0  0  0  0  0  0  0.0 
 Average  23.9            46.4 
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Appendix Table A7 (continued): Import tariffs on major agricultural imports, Bangladesh, 




H.S. Code  Item 
CD SD VAT  AIT  LF  DSC 
Tax 
Incidence 
0402.10.20 Milk  powder  25  5  15  3  2.5  2.5  58.9 
0713.40.10 Lentils  5.0  0  0  3  2.5  2.5  13.0 
0904.11.00 Pepper  37.5  0  0  3  2.5  2.5  45.5 
0904.20.10 Dried  chili  25.0  0  0  3  2.5  2.5  33.0 
0907.00.10 Clove  37.5  25  0  3  2.5  2.5  79.9 
0908.10.10 Nutmeg  37.5  15  0  3  2.5  2.5  66.1 
0908.30.10 Cardamom  37.5  40  0  3  2.5  2.5  100.5 
0909.20.10 Coriander  37.5  40  0  3  2.5  2.5  100.5 
0909.30.10 Cumin  37.5  40  0  3  2.5  2.5  100.5 
0910.10.10 Ginger  25.0  0  0  3  2.5  2.5  33.0 
1001.10.10 Wheat  5.0  0  0  3  2.5  2.5  13.0 
1006.30.00 Rice  5.0  0  0  0  0  0  5.0 
1205.00.11 Rape  seed  5.0  0  0  3  0  2.5  10.5 
1507.10.10 
Crude 
Soyabean oil  15.0  0  15  3  0  2.5  37.8 
1507.90.90 
Refined 
Soyabean oil  37.5  0  15  3  2.5  2.5  66.1 
1511.10.00  Crude palm oil  15.0  0  15  0  0  2.5  34.8 
1511.90.90 
Refined palm 
oil 37.5  0  15  3  2.5  2.5  66.1 
1701.91.00 Sugar  25  0  15  3  2.5  2.5  51.8 
2401.10.10 Tobacco  15  0  15  3  2.5  2.5  40.3 
5201.00.10 Raw  cotton  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.0 
 Average  23.3            47.8 
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Appendix Table A7 (continued): Import tariffs on major agricultural imports, Bangladesh, 




H.S. Code  Item 
CD SD VAT  AIT  LF  DSC 
Tax 
Incidence 
0402.10.20 Milk  powder  25  5  15  3  2.5  2.5  58.9 
0713.40.10 Lentils  5  0  0  3  2.5  2.5  13.0 
0904.11.00 Pepper  37.5  0  0  3  2.5  2.5  45.5 
0904.20.10 Dried  chili  25  0  0  3  2.5  2.5  33.0 
0907.00.10 Clove  37.5  25  0  3  2.5  2.5  79.9 
0908.10.10 Nutmeg  37.5  15  0  3  2.5  2.5  66.1 
0908.30.10 Cardamom  37.5  40  0  3  2.5  2.5  100.5 
0909.20.10 Coriander  37.5  40  0  3  2.5  2.5  100.5 
0909.30.10 Cumin  37.5  40  0  3  2.5  2.5  100.5 
0910.10.10 Ginger  25  0  0  3  2.5  2.5  33.0 
1001.10.10 Wheat  5  0  0  3  2.5  2.5  13.0 
1006.30.00 Rice  25  0  0  3  2.5  2.5  33.0 
1205.00.11 Rape  seed  5  0  0  0  0  2.5  7.5 
1507.10.10 
Crude 
Soyabean oil  15  0  15  3  0  2.5  37.8 
1507.90.90 
Refined 
Soyabean oil  37.5  0  15  3  2.5  2.5  66.1 
1511.10.00  Crude palm oil  15  0  15  3  0  0  35.3 
1511.90.90 
Refined palm 
oil 25  12.5  15  3  2.5  2.5  69.7 
1701.91.00 Sugar  15  0  15  3  2.5  2.5  40.3 
2401.10.10 Tobacco  15  0  15  3  2.5  2.5  40.3 
5201.00.10 Raw  cotton  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.0 
 Average  23.1            48.7 
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Appendix Table A7 (continued): Import tariffs on major agricultural imports, Bangladesh, 




H.S. Code  Item 
CD SD  VAT  AIT LF  DSC 
Tax 
Incidence 
0402.10.20 Milk  powder  32.5  10  15  3  0  3.5  74.1 
0713.40.10 Lentils  7.5  0  0  3  0  3.5  14.0 
0904.11.00 Pepper  32.5  0  0  3  0  3.5  39.0 
0904.20.10 Dried  chili  22.5  0  0  3  0  3.5  29.0 
0907.00.10 Clove  32.5  0  0  3  0  3.5  39.0 
0908.10.10 Nutmeg  32.5  0  0  3  0  3.5  39.0 
0908.30.10 Cardamom  32.5  0  0  3  0  3.5  39.0 
0909.20.10 Coriander  32.5  0  0  3  0  3.5  39.0 
0909.30.10 Cumin  32.5  0  0  3  0  3.5  39.0 
0910.10.10 Ginger  22.5  0  0  3  0  3.5  29.0 
1001.10.10 Wheat  7.5  0  0  3  0  3.5  14.0 
1006.30.00 Rice  22.5  0  0  3  0  3.5  29.0 
1205.00.11 Rape  seed  7.5  0  0  3  0  3.5  14.0 
1507.10.10 
Crude 
Soyabean oil  15  0  15  3  0  3.5  38.8 
1507.90.90 
Refined 
Soyabean oil  32.5  0  15  3  0  3.5  58.9 
1511.10.00  Crude palm oil  7.5  0  15  0  0  0  23.6 
1511.90.90 
Refined palm 
oil 32.5  0  15  3  0  3.5  58.9 
1701.91.00 Sugar  22.5  0  15  3  0  3.5  47.4 
2401.10.10 Tobacco  15  0  15  3  0  3.5  38.8 
5201.00.10 Raw  cotton  0  0  0  3  0  3.5  6.5 
 Average  22.1            35.5 
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Appendix Table A7 (continued): Import tariffs on major agricultural imports, Bangladesh, 




H.S. Code  Item 
CD SD  VAT  AIT LF  DSC 
Tax 
Incidence 
0402.10.20 Milk  powder  30  15  15  3  0  4  78.9 
0713.40.10 Lentils  7.5  0  0  0  0  0  7.5 
0904.11.00 Pepper  30  0  0  3  0  4  37.0 
0904.20.10 Dried  chili  22.5  0  0  3  0  4  29.5 
0907.00.10 Clove  30  25  0  3  0  4  69.5 
0908.10.10 Nutmeg  30  0  0  3  0  4  37.0 
0908.30.10 Cardamom  30  25  0  3  0  4  69.5 
0909.20.10 Coriander  30  0  0  3  0  4  37.0 
0909.30.10 Cumin  30  25  0  3  0  4  69.5 
0910.10.10 Ginger  15  0  0  3  0  4  22.0 
1001.10.10 Wheat  7.5  0  0  0  0  0  7.5 
1006.30.00 Rice  0  0  0  3  0  4  7.0 
1205.00.11 Rape  seed  0  0  0  3  0  0  3.0 
1507.10.10 
Crude 
Soyabean oil  7.5  0  15  0  0  0  23.6 
1507.90.90 
Refined 
Soyabean oil  30  0  15  3  0  4  56.5 
1511.10.00  Crude palm oil  7.5  0  15  0  0  0  23.6 
1511.90.90 
Refined palm 
oil 30  0  15  3  0  4  56.5 
1701.91.00 Sugar  30  30  15  3  0  4  101.4 
2401.10.10 Tobacco  15  0  15  3  0  4  39.3 
5201.00.10 Raw  cotton  0  0  0  3  0  4  7.0 
 Average  19.1            39.1 
 
 
Source: Bangladesh Ministry of Commerce.68 
     
 
Appendix Table A8: Liberalization of fertilizer markets, Bangladesh, 1978 to 1995 
 
        Actions  Time 
Span 
Remarks 
1.  BADC withdraw from retail and wholesale 
markets at Thana levels, the Primary Distribution 
Points (PDP) 
1978-83  This was in Chittagong 
Division first 
2.  Licensing requirement was abolished and 
restriction on movement removed (except 5-mile 
border Zone with India) 
1982-83  Vigorous response from 
traders 
3.  Deregulation of fertilizer price  1982-84  Real competition started 
4.  Allowing private traders direct purchase from 
factory gates and port points 
1987  Vigorous response from 
traders 
5.  Free import from world market  1992  Good response, but fear 
of oligopoly persists 
6.  Fertilizer crisis, and partial reversal of reform  1994/95  Large subsidy returns 
 
Source: Ahmed (2001). 
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Appendix Table A9: Domestic wholesale and border prices of fertilizer and their consumer 
tax equivalent for farmers,
a Bangladesh, 1975 to 2004 
 
 Import  Export   CTE,  %
 Parity  Parity Wholesale (Import
 Wholesale  Wholesale Price parity/
 Tk(2005)/Mt  Tk(2005)/Mt Tk(2005)/Mt Wholesale)
Urea  
1975-79 26,455 13,615 14,039 -47
1980-89 17,617  7,236 11,873 -32
1990-99 13,385  4,971 6,764 -48
2000-04 13,024  4,078 6,003 -53
      
TSP  
1975-79 28,056  N/A 11,046 -60
1980-89 19,741  N/A 11,912 -40
1990-99 15,490  N/A 12,291 -21
2000-04 16,050  N/A 14,144 -12
      
 
a The consumer tax equivalent (CTE) is the percentage difference between the actual 
price paid by farmers for this input and what it would be in the absence of government 
intervention protecting its manufacturers and subsidizing its users.  
 
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics, Renfro (1992), FADINAP, DAM and 
authors’ calculations 
 
 Appendix Table A10: Nominal rates of assistance to covered products, Bangladesh, 1974 to 
2004 
 (percent) 
   Jute Potato  Rice  Sugar  Tea Wheat 
All 
covered  
1974  -30  1  -26 74  1 39  -21 
1975  -53 1  105  -9  -4  140  78 
1976  -33  2 -5  -19  -14 -6 -8 
1977  -43  2 -26  65 -14  18 -23 
1978  -38  2 -28 209 -23  9 -24 
1979  -19  2 -13 213 -17  -9 -10 
1980  -30  0 -12 137 -24  1 -10 
1981  -40  1 -36 -13 -14 -19 -33 
1982  -37 1 5  56  -5  -11 4 
1983  -17 2 3  270  -9  -1 6 
1984  -22 2  14  236  -2 1  14 
1985  -21 2  39  715  -12 7  32 
1986  -54 2 8  688  -59  14 2 
1987  -44  1 42  338 -8 24 38 
1988  -20  2 12  298 -9 16 10 
1989  -38 2 1  140  -12  -5 2 
1990  -28 3  -4  124 0 3  -1 
1991  -33 3 2  137  -14  32 4 
1992  -42 2  -2  194  -12 5 0 
1993  -46  0 -11 205 -13  -3  -7 
1994  -44  2 -12 171 -21 -14  -8 
1995  -29 3  -1  124  -33 6 2 
1996  15  3 -19 111 -18 -14 -14 
1997  -3  3 -24 131 -21  -4 -17 
1998  21 3  -15  138  -5 9  -11 
1999  -32 2  -1  192  -26  16 2 
2000  -37 1 2  308  -16  19 5 
2001  -41 2 9  180  -18  -1 9 
2002  -29 2 3  149  -27  -5 4 
2003  -40 2 6  271  -22  -15 6 




b agricultural industries, and relative
c to non-agricultural 
industries, Bangladesh, 1974 to 2004  (percent)  
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Covered products 














1974 1 -21 0  -16  -29  -21  -22  46  -46 
1975 0  78  0  57 -48  93 82  29  42 
1976 1  -9 0 -6  -32  -6  -8  27  -27 
1977 1 -24 0  -18  -39  -22  -23  28  -40 
1978 1 -25 0  -19  -36  -24  -25  29  -42 
1979 2 -11 0 -7  -19  -9  -10  30  -31 
1980 1 -11 0 -7  -29  -8  -10  18  -24 
1981 1 -34 0  -27  -36  -34  -34  24  -47 
1982 1  3 0  3  -32  7  4  22  -15 
1983 1  5 0  5  -16  8  6  23  -13 
1984 1  13  0  11 -17  18 15  25  -8 
1985 1  31  0  22 -19  43 33  25 7 
1986 1  2 0  2  -55 16  2  29  -21 
1987 1  37  0  26 -37  47 40  33 5 
1988 1  8  0  7 -18  13 10  29  -15 
1989 2  -1 0  1  -33  4  2  26  -20 
1990 2  -3 0  0  -23  1  -1  29  -23 
1991 2  3 0  3  -30  7  4  32  -21 
1992 1  -1 0  0  -36  3  0  35  -26 
1993 0  -8 0 -5  -39  -5  -8  32  -30 
1994 1  -9 0 -5  -37  -6  -8  39  -34 
1995 2  -1 0  1  -30  4  2  29  -21 
1996 2 -16 0 -9 5  -15  -14  30  -34 
1997 3 -19 0  -11  -8  -18  -17  30  -36 
1998 2 -13 0 -8  13  -13  -12  32  -33 
1999 2  0 0  1  -30  4  2  25  -18 
2000 2  3 0  4  -31  8  6  25  -16 
2001 2  7 0  6  -34 12  9  25  -12 
2002 3  1 0  3  -28  6  4  21  -14 
2003 3  3 0  5  -35  9  7  26  -15 
2004 3  -8 0 -4  -37  -4  -6  20  -21 
a NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product-specific assistance.
 
b NRAs including product-specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet Bangladesh, 1974 to 2004
(percent) 
   Jute  Potato  Rice  Sugar  Tea  Wheat 
Non-
covered  
1974  9 3  61 3 0 1  23 
1975  5 4  57 7 0 0  27 
1976  5 3  64 5 1 1  22 
1977  7 2  67 3 1 1  19 
1978  6 2  68 1 1 1  21 
1979  8 2  60 1 1 1  26 
1980  6 2  63 1 1 2  25 
1981  4 2  69 4 1 3  18 
1982  5 3  62 4 1 4  22 
1983  5 2  64 1 1 4  22 
1984  5 3  61 1 2 4  25 
1985  9 3  52 1 2 4  29 
1986  11 2  52 1 2 3  29 
1987  4 3  54 1 1 3  33 
1988  5 3  62 0 1 3  26 
1989  4 3  63 2 1 3  24 
1990  4 3  62 2 1 2  27 
1991  5 2  60 2 1 2  27 
1992  4 3  61 2 1 3  27 
1993  3 3  58 2 1 3  30 
1994  3 4  56 2 1 3  31 
1995  3 3  58 2 1 3  30 
1996  2 3  58 2 1 4  31 
1997  3 3  56 2 1 4  32 
1998  3 3  59 0 1 5  29 
1999  2 5  58 1 1 4  29 
2000  2 7  57 1 1 4  29 
2001  3 4  56 1 1 4  30 
2002  3 4  58 1 1 4  28 
2003  2 6  58 1 1 3  28 
2004  2 7  61 1 1 3  26 
a At farmgate undistorted prices 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
 
 
 